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Abstract 
 
The ‗War on Terror‘ poses great challenges to democracies. The need for appropriate counter-
terrorism measures prompts greater discretion to the executive in enacting adequate 
measures. This thesis demonstrates that since September 11th 2001, the US and the UK have 
both modified and enacted further national security measures and anti-terrorism legislation 
accordingly. The thesis critically explores and examines the legality and constitutional 
legitimacy of the means that the US and UK have used, giving equal normative weight to 
national security and civil liberty imperatives. 
 
The focus is not merely between how this legislation strikes a balance between national 
security and civil liberties; it is also on the ways in which judicial intervention serves as a 
check to both executive and administrative measures. Thus, it is always necessary to conduct 
a balancing act between the rights of citizens to live in peace and security of persons and 
property, against the rights of individuals who may seek to threaten this. 
 
The core argument is that the history of both countries indicate that adhering to a human 
rights standard as far as possible, even in times of war, has both military and political 
benefits. Nevertheless, it is not claimed that all rights must be protected at all times. Instead, 
it seeks to establish a legal standard that recognises the need to protect human rights whilst 
also protecting security 
 
The thesis then turns to an examination of the judicial determinations in times of conflict 
between national security and civil liberties. The conclusion is that protecting national 
security interests is at the heart of all nations, however both the executive and the judiciary as 
upholders of the rule of law, should ensure the action taken is both adequate and necessary in 
the sense of proportionate (no more but also no less than what is called for). Thus, it calls for 
greater judicial oversight and accountability of executive action by using, as far as possible, 
the ordinary rules of criminal justice to deal with suspected terrorists. Furthermore, it is 
argued that to follow such a long term approach would provide an adequate platform for 
other countries in the struggle against terrorism. The thesis also identifies many lessons that 
can be learnt from the approach of the two countries.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis presents an in depth analysis of how anti-terrorism legislation governing domestic 
law enforcement structures, laws and policies have generally changed in the United States 
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK) since September 11, 2001. By comparing the approaches 
of the two countries, it will be possible to analyse whether these nations are achieving a 
viable constitutional balance between protecting national security and human rights. It will 
also be possible to conclude whether one country can learn from the successes and failures of 
the other country.   
 
The overall aim of the thesis is not simply to compare and contrast the approaches of the US 
and the UK. The ultimate goal is to draw important distinctions between the institutional 
practices and law of the different countries, in order to evaluate successful practices to deal 
with perceived terrorist threats. It will also analyse practices considered as inadequate in 
order for each country to avoid measures that are considered to be excessively draconian to 
individual rights and civil liberties.   
 
The thesis adopts a comparative approach. The comparison between the US with the UK is 
explained by a number of factors. Firstly, the UK has been dealing with threats of terrorism 
for many years and it is important to consider whether the attacks on the twin towers on 
September 11 changed the anti-terrorist approach in any way. Also, the thesis discusses 
whether the US has reacted in a manner that is parallel to the UK, particularly because the 
UK has faced substantial terrorist threats and attacks prior to 9/11. Furthermore, the UK is a 
leading ally of the US and it seems sensible to compare the actions of the two nations as 
many actions taken on a global level are done in conjunction with one another. This is 
reflected by the decision to wage war on Iraq, which was proposed by the US and in which 
the UK subsequently followed suit.  
 
Also, both countries are common law jurisdictions and although both nations have 
experienced terrorism, there are important constitutional differences. The US has a written 
constitution and arguably a stronger individual rights tradition. The UK, on the other hand, 
has an unwritten constitution and it is only the implementation of the Human Rights Act in 
1998 that has bought greater recognition of individual rights. 
12 
 
 
By considering the approaches of the US and the UK, it will be possible to identify whether 
there are differences in the approaches of the two countries and whether the modern threat 
from terrorism justifies the broad range of powers claimed by governments. Is it possible to 
combat terrorism through the use of enhanced domestic law without the need to potentially 
infringe so much upon civil liberties? Or does the extraordinary nature of the unconventional 
threat of terrorism require the use of extraordinary measures which justify the reduction of 
individual rights?  
 
The general approach is to explore various anti-terrorist measures and to contrast this with 
national security imperatives contained in current US and UK anti-terrorism legislation. The 
specific aim of this thesis is to critically explore the constitutional legitimacy of the measures 
taken by the US and the UK. This will involve analysing justifications offered by the 
Executive and the judiciary in their struggle to balance and reconcile specific interpretations 
of the meaning, scope and purpose of human rights imperatives against countervailing 
national security interests.  
 
Human rights legislation generally attempts to ensure a basic standard of rights to be afforded 
to all individuals, including the rights to a fair trial, and to legal access and the prohibition of 
indefinite detention. National security legislation, on the other hand, aims to protect citizens 
from further attacks thereby securing their right to life, for example. Hence in doing so, 
national security policies and legislation potentially infringe interpretations of the 
fundamental human rights of those suspected of organising or plotting such attacks. Thus, a 
crucial determination to be made is whether the declared ‗war on terror‘ is of a similar war as 
those in the past. If so, declaring war allows nations to employ actions that may be considered 
‗arbitrary‘ in ordinary times.  
 
The first chapter examines anti-terrorist measures first in the US, both prior to September 11 
and also thereafter. Analysis of pre 9/11 anti-terrorism measures focus primarily on actions 
relating to the writ of habeas corpus and the use of military commissions. It considers 
whether the Executive can act without congressional authorisation amidst a state of 
emergency. Also, does a declaration of a state of emergency justify the replacement of 
civilian courts with military commissions? This section analyses judicial determinations of 
Executive action during the American Civil War and World War II to determine whether such 
13 
 
actions were considered legitimate, and if so, to what extent?  
 
Also, the chapter analyses anti-terrorism legislation and Supreme Court decisions post 9/11 to 
highlight the struggle of both Congress and the judiciary to achieve a viable constitutional 
balance between national security imperatives and civil liberties. It questions whether the 
measures adopted by terrorists are inherently different to those measures adopted prior to 
9/11. If so, should the Executive be afforded greater power to protect national security?  
  
Thereafter, Chapter 2 considers the approach of the UK. As terrorist threats have been 
prevalent in the UK for many years prior to 9/11, it is necessary to consider whether there has 
been a move away from the pre-terrorism theme. Was further legislation necessary when the 
Terrorism Act 2000 introduced anti-terrorist provisions on a permanent basis? Measures 
relating to detention have been controversial, which is discussed with reference to case law 
and the UK‘s obligations under the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
 
These two chapters offer critical analysis and policy reasons in support of the administrations' 
efforts to protect the United States and the United Kingdom by placing the need for national 
security at this time somewhat higher in its hierarchy of values than certain aspects of 
individual civil liberties. It also provides a critical analysis of the competing argument that 
human rights must be considered to be absolute obligations on the state that prevail at all 
times, even in times of emergency and crisis. The goal here is to determine whether a viable 
balance between the competing interests is being or, in principle, can be drawn in practice. 
 
The thesis continues with a critical analysis of the judicial responses to issues regarding 
national security. Judicial reactions to statutory measures are as important as the principles of 
law themselves, as they are subject to and dependent on interpretation. The Executive often 
argue that where issues of national security arise, the judiciary should defer to the Executive 
on such matters and, therefore, not rule on such issues. However, counter arguments maintain 
that the role of the judiciary is to strictly uphold a liberal interpretation of the Rule of Law, 
and therefore to leave Executive action unquestioned would potentially lead to ‗arbitrary‘ 
Executive measures. This argument and its limits will be considered in depth.  
 
The thesis concentrates greatly on the role of the Executive and the judiciary as there are 
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clear identifiable differences in the constitutional Separation of Powers in the US and the UK. 
It is important to examine judicial responses to Executive action in order to highlight the role 
of the judiciary in each country, as the role of the judiciary is different in the US than in the 
UK. The constitutional arrangements in the US are historically stronger, whereas the 
Separation of Powers in is weaker and more blurred in the UK. The US Supreme Court is 
arguably more active than the British House of Lords as the US Supreme Court has made 
momentous decisions on social issues such as abortion
1
 and segregation.
2
 
 
The thesis discusses the contention that as the Executive have traditionally had a wide 
discretion on the powers it adopts in times of emergency, does this mean Executive action in 
the name of national security should remain unquestioned by the courts and the legislature? 
Or, is there a slow but noticeable assertion of authority from the courts and the legislature in 
both countries? Should nations, as far as possible, adopt a human rights approach which 
upholds long standing and fundamental values or should the primary focus be on protecting 
national security, irrespective of whether this reduces individual human rights? 
Fundamentally, can a balance be achieved between the two?   
 
The key phrase here is ―as far as possible‖, which raises the question of under what 
circumstances it is possible to adopt an unqualified human rights approach? Hence, the thesis 
recognises that the national security perspective and associated imperatives concerning a 
government's obligation to protect the security and physical protection needs of all citizens is 
also extremely important. Failing to address threats to the nation may also ultimately lead to 
loss of fundamental human rights of the citizens of the nation, e.g. right to life, freedom from 
fear, the enjoyment of a democratic and orderly way of life and security of property. It 
recognises that successful acts of terrorism, as well as excessive emergency powers measures, 
both violate the Rule of Law. Thus, the thesis considers whether there are viable alternatives 
to anti-terrorist measures such as indefinite detention which violate individual liberties such 
as the right to a fair trial. Also, are these alternative measures adequate to deal with the 
perceived threat of terrorism? 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Roe v Wade [1973] 410 U.S. 113 
2
 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka [1954] 347 U.S. 483 
15 
 
1 
US Anti Terrorism Legislation Pre & Post 9/11 
 
This chapter examines the approach of the United States during times of war in order to 
identify and discuss measures adopted in times of emergency, to combat threats to national 
security. In particular, the thesis focuses on measures which interfere with the right to a fair 
trial and examines the suspension of habeas corpus and the use of alternatives, such as 
military commissions instead of ordinary courts, to try suspected terrorists. As such measures 
reject the idea of applying ‗ordinary‘ law for suspected terrorists, this appears to suggest a 
change towards a context where 'the exception' becomes the norm (that is becomes 
'normalised'), and the norm (of broad conformity with liberal legality) becomes the 
exception.  For example, suspension of habeas corpus and the use of military commissions in 
the US were common measures only during wartime, as was detention without trial in the 
UK.  
 
The chapter continues by critically analysing responses to the ‗war on terror‘, including 
legislation, judicial responses and policy initiatives. By considering the measures adopted in 
response to threats to national security prior to the terrorist attacks, this section identifies 
significant differences in the measures enacted by the Executive after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11.   
 
This section on the US examines two issues. Firstly, the right to a writ of habeas corpus, as 
guaranteed by Article I of the US Constitution, will be discussed with reference to the use of 
the writ of habeas corpus and its suspension prior to 9/11. According to some, criticism of the 
Bush administration was ―ill-founded when one considers that the President's actions pale in 
comparison to actions taken by prior Presidents, such as Abraham Lincoln.‖3 It is, therefore, 
important to consider these actions as although the decisions were unpopular in many circles, 
they were considered necessary in a time where the nation was widely perceived of as faced 
with great national security problems. Thus, as the US is yet again facing threats to its 
national security, controversial decisions may be required. However, it is also argued that, 
―too often concerns over national security have become ‗catchall‘ excuses for systematic 
                                                 
3
 Williams, R. (2007) ‗Still A Frightening Unknown: Achieving A Constitutional Balance Between Civil 
Liberties And National Security During The War On Terror,‘ University Law Review 675, p.2. 
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violations of human rights‖ and therefore the response taken should be proportionate to the 
threat posed.
4
 
 
Secondly, the section considers national security concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
These have led to legislation which affords the President extensive powers in the aim to 
protect the security of the nation and its citizens. Thereafter, the struggle of the US Supreme 
Court to strike a viable and defensible constitutional balance between national security and 
civil liberties in decisions such as Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan will be examined. This will be 
followed by analysis of legislation such as the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) and Military 
Commissions Act (MCA). Lastly, the decision in Boumediene will be analysed, where the 
initial review by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was a significant 
victory for the Executive as it upheld the legality of the MCA which prevented alien 
detainees from petitioning for habeas corpus.
5
 The subsequent decision of the Supreme Court 
significantly differed however, and its implications also need to be addressed.  
 
1.1 Suspension of Habeas Corpus prior to 9/11  
 
(i) The writ of habeas corpus 
 
Habeas corpus is a Latin term which means ‗produce the body‘.6 The writ of habeas corpus 
is an important instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against ‗arbitrary‘ state action 
by allowing prisoners to challenge the legality of their detention. This right was incorporated 
into the US Constitution and: ―has been for centuries deemed the best and only sufficient 
defence of personal freedom.‖7 The US Constitution supposedly inscribes the fundamental 
principles on which governance of the country is founded and sustained. Hence, the 
longstanding constitutional recognition of the writ of habeas corpus is highly significant.   
 
(ii) Suspension of habeas corpus 
 
The War on Terror has led the US government to implement many new counterterrorism 
                                                 
4
 Landman, T. (2008) ‗Imminence and Proportionality: The U.S. and U.K. Responses to Global Terrorism‘, 104 
California Western International Law Journal Vol 38, p 32 
5
 Boumediene v. Bush [2007] 476 F3d 981 (D.C. Cir) 
6
 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2000) 4
th
 Edition (Houghton Mifflin Company) 
7
 Ex Parte Yerger [1868] 75 U.S. 85 95-96 (1868), per Chief Justice Chase 
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policies, which critics argue are inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore, of dubious 
legitimacy. This is particularly the case in relation to the restriction of the right that allows 
suspected terrorists to challenge the legality of their detention by petitioning for writ of 
habeas corpus before an Article III court.
8
 However, this right is not absolute and the writ can 
be suspended ‗when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.‖9  
Although the Constitution is silent regarding which branch has the power to suspend the writ, 
it has typically been considered by senior judges as a power bestowed upon Congress 
alone.
10
  
 
Due to these limitations, the decision to suspend the writ has rarely been implemented and 
even when it has, it has been during times of perceived great danger.
11
 For example, during 
the American Civil War,
12
 amidst insurrection by the Ku Klux Klan in southern states,
13
 and 
during World War II after the attack on Pearl Harbour.
14
 The infrequency of such action is 
demonstrated by the refusal of Congress to allow President Jefferson to suspend the writ to 
deal with Aaron Burr‘s conspiracy to overthrow the government.15   
 
Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ during the American Civil War in 1861. Lincoln‘s claim 
that by necessary implication, he, as Commander in Chief, held the constitutional power to 
authorise suspension of the writ, did not go unchallenged however. Only a month after 
Lincoln's proclamation, John Merryman, who had spoken out against President Lincoln, was 
arrested for various acts of treason. The government believed that Merryman's decision to 
form an armed group to overthrow the government was an act far beyond a simple expression 
of dissatisfaction, which would be protected under the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
8
 Article III of the United States Constitution confers the judicial power of the US in ―one Supreme Court and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.‖ US Constitution, Article III 
9
 Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, US Constitution. 
10
 Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. 4 Cranch 75, 101 (1807) - ―If at any time the public safety 
should require the suspension of the powers vested…in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to 
say so.‖ 
11
 Halliday, P. D. and White, E.G. (2008) ‗The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, And 
American Implications‘ Virginia Law Review 94, page 93 
12
 An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases Ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 
(1863) 
13
 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
for other Purposes, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) 
14
 The Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900) 
15
 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S 507, 563, Justice Scalia dissenting, (citing 16 Annals of Congress 402-425 
(1807)) 
18 
 
Although the courts in Ex parte Merryman
16
  may have interpreted the right in a restrictive 
way to help restore calm during the war, Chief Justice Roger Taney asserted ―that the 
President has exercised a power which he does not possess.‖17 Maintaining there is ―no 
ground whatever for supposing that the President can authorize suspension,‖ the Chief 
Justice claimed that only Congress has the power to suspend the writ.
18
 Taney‘s objections 
clarify who holds the constitutional power to suspend the writ.  
 
Lincoln justified his actions stating that, ―whether strictly legal or not, [these] were ventured 
upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as 
now, that Congress would readily ratify them.‖19 Despite the fact that the Constitution is 
silent regarding which branch of government is authorised to exercise the power to suspend 
habeas corpus, Lincoln‘s statement reflects that he had exercised a power that required some 
level of approval from Congress.  
 
However, any confusion regarding the legality of Lincoln‘s actions to suspend the writ was 
quashed two years later when Congress enacted legislation empowering the President to 
suspend the writ nation-wide while rebellion continued.
20
 
 
In September 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation, declaring martial law and authorising the 
use of military tribunals to try civilians within the United States who were believed to be 
―guilty of disloyal practice‖ or who ―afforded aid and comfort to Rebels.‖21 With this order as 
justification, Vallandigham, a US citizen, was charged with declaring disloyal opinions with 
the object of causing an unlawful rebellion. Despite being captured away from the battlefield, 
he faced trial before a military commission. He claimed the military commission was 
unconstitutional and contrary to his right to a ―speedy and public trial by an impartial jury‖, 
as well as other rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
22
 However, his claims were 
rejected and he failed to successfully petition the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas 
                                                 
16
 Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (no. 9847) 
17
 Ibid at 145 
18
 Ibid at 147 
19
 Abraham Lincoln, Speech to Special Session of Congress (July 4, 1861), as reprinted in 4 Coll. Works, supra 
note 2, at 429. 
20
 Habeas Corpus Act, ch. 80, 12 Stat. 755 (1863). 
21
 Proclamation Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sept. 24, 1862), as reprinted in 5 The Collected Works 
of Abraham Lincoln 518, 524 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers University Press, 1953) at 436-437 
22
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corpus.
23
 The case was eventually bought to the Supreme Court on motion for 
certiorari.
24
 However, the Supreme Court refused to review the proceedings of the military 
commission because it ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. By implication, it upheld the authority 
of the military commission by refusing Vallandigham the writ.   
 
Shortly after, the Supreme Court was again required to consider similar issues in Ex parte 
Milligan.
25
 Milligan was tried and sentenced to death by a military commission, despite being 
captured away from the battlefield and where civilian courts were functioning.
26
 In a 
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the military commission had no 
jurisdiction to try Milligan. Justice Davis explained, ―Martial rule can never exist where the 
courts are open....‖27 The Court therefore declared that the guarantees which safeguard the 
Fifth Amendment constitutional right to due process are not to be set aside during war. The 
underlying reason for the Milligan decision was the idea that the right to trial by jury is 
preserved for everyone accused of crime that is unrelated to members of the army, navy, or 
militia in actual service.  
 
Recognising that the writ of habeas corpus may legitimately be suspended during times of 
war where citizens join enemy forces, the Court reaffirmed Taney‘s opinion in Merryman that 
―there could be no suspension of the writ or declaration of martial law by the Executive, or 
by any other than the supreme legislative authority.‖28 It also emphasised that that suspension 
is limited to discharging the government from its obligation of producing a person arrested in 
answer to a writ. The Constitution ―does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a 
citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of the common law.‖29 Therefore, it 
does not permit the replacement of civilian courts with military commissions.  
 
(iii) Trials by Military Commissions 
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In contrast to Vallandigham, the Court in Milligan confined the use of military commissions 
to military personnel and allies and, therefore, prevented arbitrary use of such powers against 
all others. However, in Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court considered President Roosevelt‘s 
similar decision to deny captives‘ access to US courts by authorising trials by military 
commissions.
30
   
 
Upholding the jurisdiction of military commissions, the Court held ‗unlawful combatants‘, 
regardless of citizenship, can be tried by military commission for violations of the law of war 
without this constituting a violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.
31
 Furthermore, the 
Court distinguished Milligan for a number of reasons. Firstly, Milligan was a civilian, and a 
civilian, even one who commits war related crimes, is entitled to trial by jury in a civilian 
court. According to the Court, the saboteurs were inevitably due to face trial by military 
commission due to their admission that they were enemy combatants.
32
 Additionally, 
whereas Quirin involved unlawful enemy combatants, Milligan was a citizen of Indiana and 
had never been a resident of any state involved in the rebellion, nor had he been an enemy 
combatant who would qualify as a prisoner of war.
33
 
 
Therefore, the decision in Quirin permits military commissions for individuals who are part 
of the ―enemy's war forces‖ that invade the country from abroad, 34 which arguably leaves 
―untouched‖ the Court's earlier opinion in Milligan.35 By highlighting these critical 
distinctions, the Court successfully resolved the issues surrounding the legitimacy of using 
military commissions to try unlawful enemy combatants in the US. Thus, the use of military 
commissions for those captured abroad and engaged in hostilities against the US was 
considered legitimate. 
 
                                                 
30
 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942): ―[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents 
of any nation at war with the United States… and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United 
States ... and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or 
warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military 
tribunals…‖, page 12. 
31
 Ex parte Quirin [1942] 317 U.S. 1, 45 
32
 Ibid at 45-46. The Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld referred to the saboteurs in Quirin as ―admitted 
enemy combatants.‖ Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2782 (2006). 
33
 A ‗lawful enemy combatant‘ is afforded protections as he is classified as a prisoner of war in accordance with 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention) 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 135, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c8.html.  
34
 Ibid Quirin at 46. 
35
 Fisher, L. (2003) Nazi Saboteurs on Trial: A Military Tribunal & American Law, 1
st
 edition (University Press 
of Kansas) (quoting Memorandum from Justice Black to Chief Justice Stone, Black Papers (Oct. 2, 1942)). 
21 
 
Further issues regarding aliens captured by the US on foreign territories arose in Johnson v 
Eisentrager.
36
 Denying the prisoners‘ petitions for habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held 
that non resident aliens
37
 captured and imprisoned abroad are ―beyond the territorial 
jurisdiction of any court of the United States.‖38    
 
These cases clearly indicate that issues surrounding suspension of the writ and the use of 
military commissions are contentious. It is therefore necessary to consider whether 
government actions after 9/11 are consistent with prior US practice recognised as lawful. 
Decisions by the Supreme Court regarding habeas corpus petitions from detainees captured 
beyond the US will demonstrate the significance of Eisentrager in the arguments put forward 
by the government. Problems similar to those faced by Lincoln and Roosevelt regarding the 
writ of habeas corpus would also be of paramount concern to the Supreme Court over half a 
century later.   
 
Also, by reviewing legislation enacted to combat terrorism after 9/11, it will be possible to 
see whether the measures adopted are inherently different to those discussed above. If so, it 
will be asked if this is because the magnitude of the current threat is greater than previous 
threats, which means that the US is compelled to employ new, more efficient strategies?  
 
1.2 Protecting national security after 9/11 by counter terrorism measures 
 
Terrorism is one of the major challenges faced by modern democracies. The threats raised by 
terrorist activity are very real, but also very difficult to deal with in an effective and 
proportionate manner.
39
 Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, both the US 
and the UK have adopted a pre-emptive approach by enacting legislation to try and prevent 
further terrorist attacks. 
 
Although terrorism is not a new concept, the definition of terrorism has become greatly 
significant since the US has become engaged in ―the war on terror‖. More than a hundred 
definitions of terrorism exist,
40
 and there has ―never been… some golden age in which 
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terrorism was easy to define.‖41  
 
The U.S. Department of State has used Title 22 of the United States Code to define terrorism 
as ―politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national 
groups or clandestine agents.‖42 Oots defines terrorism as intending to ―create extreme fear 
and/or anxiety-inducing effects in a target audience larger than the immediate victims.‖43 
Interestingly, the definition post 9/11 has changed to include religious and ideological 
motivations.   
 
For example, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as ―the unlawful 
use of force or violence ... in furtherance of political or social objectives.‖44  Furthermore, the 
US Department of Defense extends this by encompassing the ‗threat‘ of unlawful violence for 
‗religious‘ and ‗ideological‘ causes also.45 It is clear therefore that the meaning of terrorism is 
embedded in a person‘s or nation‘s philosophy. Thus, the determination of the ―right‖ 
definition of terrorism is subjective or includes a subjectively variable element.
46
  
 
The attacks on the twin towers led to the declaration of a national emergency in the US, and 
to the enactment of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The AUMF 
authorises the President to: "use all necessary and appropriate force against those . . . who he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks."
47
 By enacting 
such an open-ended measure, Congress ratified the broad duties of the President as 
Commander in Chief to protect national security and prevented any potential criticism of 
Bush for acting unilaterally and then dealing with legal implications after, as had been the 
case with Lincoln.   
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The first consideration in establishing adequate counter terrorist measures was that of existing 
national security policy. Within the US, the term ‗national security strategy‘ has ―long been 
recognised by courts…as a notoriously ambiguous and ill-defined phrase.‖48 A seemingly 
concise definition of national security is ―the ability of national institutions to prevent 
adversaries from using force to harm Americans or their national interests‖.
49
 
 
Therefore, to prevent further terrorist attacks, the National Security Strategy 
2002
50
 emphasised the need to eradicate ―terrorist organisations of global reach and attack 
their leadership: command, control, and communications; material support; and 
finances.‖51 Recognising that terrorist threats are not confined to Al-Qaeda, the US proposed 
measures which significantly increased the powers of the President and the law enforcement 
agencies. These include increased surveillance and search capabilities, the use of military 
commissions, and depriving Federal Courts of habeas jurisdiction.  
 
The first of these counter-terrorist measures was introduced by the USA Patriot Act 2001, 
which was enacted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
52
 The Act permits increased 
surveillance. In particular, it authorises the interception of electronic communications for the 
collection of evidence related to terrorism, computer fraud, and abuse.
53
 It also expands the 
situations in which surveillance may be conducted so that it is no longer limited to ‗aliens‘.54   
 
Most significantly, and controversially, the Act authorises secret detentions and the authority 
to designate American citizens as "enemy combatants". Thus, the Act authorises the indefinite 
detention of those who the Executive detriment to be an ‗enemy combatant‘.   
 
President Bush further emphasised the existence of a state of war by issuing an order which 
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authorises the establishment of military commissions. The Military Order 2001
55
 granted 
―exclusive jurisdiction‖ to military commissions to try suspected terrorists classed as ‗enemy 
combatants‘.56 Military commissions are constitutionally and statutorily authorised special 
courts which are composed of military personnel who are commissioned to determine fact 
and law. Bush‘s order made it clear that such tribunals could not operate without modifying 
the principles of laws and the rules of evidence generally recognised in the trial of criminal 
cases in Federal Courts.  
 
The Order applies only to non-US citizens and, controversially, mandates protection of 
classified information. The Order provides for ‗a full and fair trial‘,57 and the right to 
counsel.
58
 Hence, supporters argue those subject to the order are ―far more fortunate than 
their counterparts in earlier times.‖59 However, critics argue it highlights the intention of the 
government to try ‗war criminals‘ by special military tribunals and not in Federal Courts.60  
Also, although the defendant is presumed innocent and is represented by a lawyer, military 
commissions differ to civilian courts in the following five aspects.   
 
Firstly, they do not allow judicial review by an independent civilian court.  Also, they permit 
prosecutions of persons for crimes unrelated to violations of the laws of war. Additionally, 
secret intelligence sources are admissible in military commissions, which is particularly 
controversial because much of this is claimed to have been obtained through the use of 
torture.  Furthermore, trials may be conducted in secret and the army will select a lawyer for 
the suspect. Finally, they limit greatly the right to prepare a defence. Disclosure of classified 
information is limited in military commissions to a select few, and more significantly, 
excludes civilian lawyers. This need is reinforced by national security considerations. Forcing 
the government to disclose its methods and techniques would be ―foolhardy at best and 
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would compromise its effectiveness permanently.‖61  
 
By using military commissions, the government has prevented the use of civilian courts, and 
subsequently banned the possibility of recourse by way of an appeals procedure. President 
Bush‘s decision strengthens global US domination because it ―empowers the President to do 
whatever he wishes to prisoners without any legal limitation, as long as he does it 
offshore.
62
 Such military tribunals could be established in any suspect country, without the 
need for any accountability.  
 
The order makes it clear that the Executive planned to treat the attacks as acts of war rather 
than criminal acts, which is consistent with the idea of the ‗war on terror‘. This distinction 
has more than rhetorical significance; it sends a clear message that the US Administration 
leant heavily in favour of prosecuting those responsible as war criminals, by trying them 
using special military commissions rather than in Federal Courts for crimes, such as murder, 
for example.   
 
This is further demonstrated by the way in which the US has classified detainees. The 
treatment of those captured by the US ultimately depends on their initial classification. The 
law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of 
belligerent nations, and also between those who are lawful and unlawful 
combatants.  Classifying one as a prisoner of war means that they must be afforded prisoner 
of war status, as guaranteed by the Geneva Conventions. Similarly, ‗lawful enemy 
combatants‘ are subject to capture and detention as ‗prisoners of war‘ by opposing military 
forces, in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention.  
 
A ‗lawful enemy combatant‘  is defined as a person who is: (a) a member of the regular forces 
of a State party engaged in hostilities against the United States; (b) a member of a militia, 
volunteer corps, or organised resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such 
hostilities, which are under responsible command,  wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable 
at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of war; or (c) a member of a 
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regular armed force who professes allegiance to a government engaged in such hostilities, but 
not recognized by the US. 
 
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are 
subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency 
unlawful.
63
 An ‗unlawful enemy combatant‘ is defined as: (a) a person who has engaged in 
hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United 
States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is 
part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (b) a person who, before, on, or after 
the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to 
be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another 
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the Secretary of 
Defense. (c) ―Co-belligerent‖ means any State or armed force joining and directly engaged 
with the US in hostilities or directly supporting hostilities against a common enemy. By using 
this term, the US has drawn a distinction which prevents prisoners from being afforded 
‗prisoner of war‘ status.  
 
Using such classifications is again consistent with the idea of a war, as by classifying Al-
Qaeda fighters as ‗combatants‘, they are being treated as soldiers. This means the rules of 
war, military force and Geneva Conventions all become applicable to the detainees, and this 
allows the use of military commissions. This is demonstrated by the US‘s attempt to prevent 
detainees‘ access to US Federal Courts by classifying fighters as ‗combatants‘.   
 
However, treating the attacks as acts of war rather than criminal acts can have negative 
repercussions. Classifying Al-Qaeda fighters as ‗combatants‘ suggests the fighters are a 
militia with a just cause or political end.  Hence, such attacks may be seen as a 
‗struggle‘ rather than crimes, encouraging greater sympathy and support, particularly as they 
are considered by some as ‗freedom fighters‘. In contrast, classifying such people as 
‗criminals‘, may prevent sympathy for the cause as those captured would simply be 
considered criminals guilty of contravening the law of the state. Their motive and reasons for 
breaking the law, regardless of whether it is for what they considered to be a just case, would 
therefore be of little significance. 
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1.3 Judicial Response to Executive Action  
 
Issues regarding the writ of habeas corpus were addressed when both US and non-US 
detainees held in Guantanamo Bay petitioned the Federal Courts for habeas corpus relief. By 
analysing the landmark Supreme Court decisions, firstly in Hamdi, and then in Rasul, it will 
be possible to identify whether the actions of the Executive are consistent with legally 
required levels of due process. 
 
The ruling in Hamdi v Rumsfeld
64
 is significant. Whilst recognising the Executive‘s power to 
incarcerate a US citizen accused of terrorism without charge or trial, the court reaffirmed ―the 
fundamental nature of a citizen‘s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own 
government without due process of law.‖65   
 
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen by birth, was seized in 2001 and classified as an enemy 
combatant. Hamdi's father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the US District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. His counsel argued detention without charge and 
legal access was a breach of Hamdi‘s rights under the Fifth66 and Fourteenth 
Amendments,
67
 in that he was being deprived of his liberty and being detained without due 
process of law.   
 
Although initially, the US District Court ordered that a federal public defender be assigned 
and given unmonitored access to Hamdi, the decision was reversed in a subsequent appeal by 
the Government. The Fourth Circuit Court held that the district court failed to have regard to 
the government‘s intelligence and national security concerns. Supporting the government‘s 
argument for maintaining the separation of powers, the court held that ―political branches are 
best positioned to comprehend this global war in its full context,‖ and so, the option to detain 
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until the cessation of hostilities was entirely that of the Executives.
68
    
 
Hence, the District Courts statement that more factual assertions should be produced was 
dismissed as the court held that doing so, ―would be to wade further into the conduct of war 
than we consider appropriate.‖69 The court remanded the case with directions to dismiss 
Hamdi's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, Hamdi successfully filed a petition 
with the US Supreme Court, where the court was required to decide numerous issues.   
 
The court first considered the legality of Hamdi‘s detention. Hamdi contended that his 
detention violated the Non-Detention Act,
70
 which states ―no citizen shall be imprisoned or 
otherwise detained by the US except pursuant to an Act of Congress.‖71 However, the court 
accepted the government‘s argument that the words ―necessary and appropriate force‖ in the 
AUMF
72
 satisfies the requirement that an individual is being detained pursuant to ―an Act of 
Congress.‖73 Hamdi further argued that the AUMF did not authorise indefinite detention. 
Whilst accepting that the US ―may detain, for the duration of the hostilities‖, the Court 
agreed that his detention may not continue after active hostilities have ended. In response to 
Hamdi's assertion that his detention could last for the duration of his lifetime due to the 
character of the War on Terror, the Court relied on the fact that, at the time of the opinion, 
active combat operations in Afghanistan were ongoing. However, as Erwin Chemerinsky 
points out, the war on terrorism shows no signs of abating and it is already longer than World 
War I or World War II.
74
 
 
The level of constitutional due process available to US citizens labelled enemy combatants 
was also considered. The Court held that citizen-detainees such as Hamdi must 
receive "notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.‖75   
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The final issue concerned whether the separation of powers limited the role of the judiciary in 
implicating the President's war powers. The court rejected the government‘s claim that 
separation of powers principles ―mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such 
circumstances.‖ The court asserted that wartime does not afford the President a ―blank check‖ 
in dealing with citizens rights.
76
  The court felt ―it would turn our system of checks and 
balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a 
challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his Government simply because the 
Executive opposes making available such a challenge.‖77 Thus, the court‘s decision makes it 
explicitly clear that Hamdi must be given a meaningful factual hearing, which at a minimum 
includes notice of the charges, the right to respond, and the right to be represented by an 
attorney, rights which are considered by many as absolute rights.
78
 
 
However, the ruling failed to adequately instruct lower courts regarding the proper course for 
factually similar cases in the future. Firstly, the plurality opinion declined to define the term 
"enemy combatant". The Court also failed to outline a constitutionally acceptable procedure 
for determining whether a citizen-detainee's enemy combatant status is accurate. Additionally, 
the court suggested military tribunals may be constitutionally acceptable to fulfil the role of 
the neutral decision-maker. Furthermore, the Court suggested that hearsay evidence might be 
admissible and the burden of proof could even be placed on Hamdi. Since the fairness and the 
constitutionality of the due process hearing is paramount to the legitimacy of detaining 
citizen-enemy combatants in wartime, the Court's opinion on the four counts above leaves the 
outlook for US citizens disputing their detention in conjunction with the ‗war on terror‘ 
murky and ambiguous.  
 
The Court did not question the legitimacy of the Executive‘s actions to seize and detain any 
person suspected of terrorism as an enemy combatant and so the actions of the Executive are 
not legally and constitutionally restricted. Instead, the court rejected the government‘s 
argument that suspects can be detained indefinitely without judicial review of the basis on 
which they are detained.  
 
                                                 
76
 Ibid at 2650 (plurality opinion) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952)) 
77
 Ibid at 2650 
78
 Chemerinsky, E., ibid, p 19 
30 
 
Nevertheless, many believed such a decision was valid. Anderson argued that the result 
reached by the majority opinion in Hamdi was correct. When a US citizen is captured on the 
battlefield by the United States military in conjunction with the War on Terror, the 
Government may not label that individual an "enemy combatant" and indefinitely detain him 
without access to a lawyer. The citizen's right to due process guaranteed by the Constitution 
mandates that he be given a meaningful hearing before a neutral decision-maker in which he 
may rebut the underlying facts of his detention and "enemy combatant" label. Anderson also 
agrees that the Court correctly reasoned that the President was congressionally authorized to 
detain citizens and non-citizens, once it has been sufficiently established that the individual is 
an enemy combatant.
79
  
 
Similar issues, albeit regarding non-US citizens, arose in Rasul v. Bush.
80
 In a landmark 
ruling, the Supreme Court held that Federal Courts did indeed have jurisdiction to hear 
habeas petitions from non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay.
81
   
 
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the government‘s argument that the detainees were 
foreign nationals outside US sovereign territory, which barred them from challenging their 
detention in US courts. Although the government invoked the decision in Johnson v 
Eisentrager,
82
 where German citizens captured by US forces in China had no right to bring 
habeas corpus applications in US courts, the majority in Rasul identified important 
differences between the Eisentrager and Guantanamo detainees. Firstly, the court held that 
Guantanamo detainees are not nationals of a country which can be categorically classed as 
being at war with the US. Next, these persons deny engagement in acts of violence against 
the US. Furthermore, the detainees have never been charged or afforded access to any 
tribunals, and additionally, they are held in territory under US control.  
 
The government‘s argument that the naval base lies outside the jurisdiction of US courts also 
failed to convince the court. Stevens held that legislation purports that district courts can, 
‗within their respective jurisdictions‘, entertain habeas applications by persons claiming to be 
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held in violation of the laws of the US.
83
 Such jurisdiction extends to aliens, held in a 
territory over which the US ―exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ultimate 
sovereignty.‖84 Noting that, by the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the US 
exercises ―complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo Bay, it was held that the 
jurisdiction of the US courts extends to those detained there.
85
  
 
Nevertheless, the court left unanswered several questions. Firstly, the majority offered no 
guidance on the process to be employed in reviewing the legality of the detentions. Next, the 
majority's interpretation of the habeas statute
86
 could be interpreted to mean that the specific 
holding of Eisentrager has been overruled. Also, as Justice Scalia argued in his dissenting 
judgement, the Court's extension of federal habeas jurisdiction ―to the four corners of the 
earth‖87 could potentially mean that even an alien captured, tried, and convicted by a military 
commission, and incarcerated outside US sovereign territory, may arguably have access to 
US courts. Finally, the majority's opinion contains no discussion of whether petitioners have 
any substantive rights under the US Constitution, especially the rights to correct legal 
procedure, a speedy and public trial and to due process and equal protection.  
 
Despite this, the case is significant in according the Guantanamo prisoners access to Federal 
Courts and in providing such courts a role in prescribing the procedures to be followed, ―If 
nothing else, Rasul has opened the window at Guantanamo by requiring the government to 
justify its detention policy in a court of law.‖88 The impact of these 'enemy combatant' 
decisions may, however, be much more limited than what Justice Scalia's dissent 
in Rasul suggests.   
 
Rather than developing a comprehensive legal framework governing the conduct of the ‗war 
on terrorism‘, the Supreme Court stuck to the narrow issues presented by the specific cases at 
hand. Therefore, numerous crucial questions raised by the detention practices, as well as by 
the justifications advanced in their support, remain unanswered. Furthermore, the decisions 
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do not question the powers claimed by the Executive, such as the classification of detainees 
as ‗enemy combatants‘.  Whalin argues that US Congress and courts have implicitly 
authorized the President to detain those individuals, regardless of citizenship, whom he 
determines are enemy combatants, either without charging them, or concrete evidence of their 
terrorist connections.
89
 However if the administration is right, it could capture US citizens on 
American soil, far from any battlefield and unconnected to any traditional armed conflict, and 
detain them indefinitely as 'enemy combatants' without charge.  
 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court‘s decisions remains significant. In Hamdi, the Executive is 
reminded that foreign citizens must be afforded the correct due process. In Rasul, the Court 
upheld the right of foreign detainees to challenge the legality of their detention. 
The Rasul decision resulted in high numbers of habeas corpus petitions to the US District 
Court for the District of Columbia. However, there appears to be inconsistencies between 
decisions.   
 
When faced with the opportunity to check the power of the Executive branch and restore 
individual freedom, the US Supreme Court, in one instance, upheld the government's 
authority to detain citizens and offered only a modified form of due process to the detainee.
90
 
In another instance, however, it refused to address the issue altogether, twice delaying the 
constitutional inquiry based on jurisdictional technicalities and procedural preferences.
91
 It is 
clear from these cases that the court's function in time of war is to make sure that detentions 
are not without justification and to provide detainees with an opportunity to challenge the 
Government regarding their classification as enemy combatants and the legality of their 
detentions. Once evidence is presented to the courts that a detainee is being detained as a 
result of participating in active hostilities against the US, and that the detainee is an enemy 
combatant, the role of the court in the matter is completed.
92
 
 
Furthermore, in a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court declared that military commissions 
―lack the power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the Uniform 
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Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the four Geneva Conventions.‖93 Despite contrary 
assertions by the government, the Court upheld its right to hear the appeal in Hamdan v 
Rumsfeld,
94
 asserting the DTA does not strip Federal Courts‘ jurisdiction over cases pending 
on the date of its enactment.  
 
Hamdan was designated for trial before a military commission however his petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus was upheld by the district court. The court held that Hamdan could not be 
tried by a military commission unless he was found by a competent tribunal not to be a 
‗prisoner of war‘ under the Third Geneva Convention.95 On appeal, however, the DC Circuit 
Court reversed the district court‘s decision.   
 
On 29 June 2006, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeal. Ruling that 
it had jurisdiction, the Court declared that the government did not have authority to set up 
these military commissions, and such tribunals were illegal under both the UCMJ and the 
Geneva Conventions.   
 
Rejecting the government‘s argument regarding the President‘s powers, Justice Kennedy 
stated: ―As presently structured, Hamdan's military commission exceeds the bounds Congress 
has placed on the President's authority…‖96 Four members of the Court explicitly advised 
the President to reconsider his strategy and to ―return to Congress to seek the authority he 
believes necessary.‖97 They reaffirmed that the Government has identified no ―important 
countervailing interest‖ that permits courts to depart from their general ―duty to exercise the 
jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.‖98   
 
1.4 Legislative Response to the Supreme Court decisions 
 
The Court‘s decisions placed the military and armed forces in ―an unexpected and untenable 
position‖, where the United States government was continuously faced with questions 
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regarding ―an indeterminate number of issues related to detaining prisoners.‖99 The 
government considered other methods of circumventing the above decisions by using 
methods such as transferring non-citizen detainees to prisons built and monitored by the 
United States in their countries of citizenship, ostensibly under the control of those nations.
100
 
Instead, however the Supreme Court decisions led to Congress enacting the following 
legislation.   
 
Firstly, due to the influx in habeas petitions after Rasul, Congress enacted the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA) 2005, which purported to deprive the Federal Courts of habeas 
jurisdiction.
101
 The Act restricts the right of a person designated as an ‗enemy combatant‘ to 
petition US Federal Courts for a writ of habeas corpus. The DTA authorises an appeal to the 
courts by a person designated as an ―enemy combatant‖, or convicted by a military 
commission after the military trial and appeal is concluded. Detainees can request to review 
the proceeding of the tribunal which can only be heard by the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit and is only permitted providing it is an appeal related to the 
composition of the review tribunal, or an appeal of the initial decision. The request is purely 
procedural and does not involve an investigation of the facts themselves.   
 
The US justifies such measures by claiming that detainees in Guantanamo are dangerous and 
a threat to global security. This is the legal implementation of ―a space of non-law within the 
law.‖102 The legislation effectively allows the US administration to imprison individuals and 
refuse to afford them the right to a fair trial, and thus potentially restrict the possibility of 
legal recourse. Nevertheless, it is important because the Act provides detainees a means of 
access to the United States federal court system to ensure that any final decision by the 
military commission and appeal thereafter is consistent with the military order and the United 
States Constitution.  
 
Despite having ‗solved‘ this problem however, Congress was also urged by the Executive to 
address issues surrounding the use of military commissions. The decision of the Supreme 
Court in Hamdan prompted the Executive to reconsider their strategy. The decision 
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demonstrated that the government's first attempt at achieving the proper constitutional 
balance between national security and civil liberties had not been successful.   
 
Thus, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act 2006, which enhanced the use of 
military commissions. The Act suspends habeas corpus for any person determined to be an 
―unlawful enemy combatant"; determination of which is at the discretion of the US Executive 
and for which there is no right of appeal. The result is that this potentially suspends habeas 
corpus for any non-citizen.
103
 However, the MCA highlights the importance of a just system 
to prosecute suspected terrorists and therefore provides for a number of safeguards.  
 
Firstly, the Act authorises a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), or another competent 
tribunal established under the authority of either the President or the Secretary of Defense, to 
decide if a prisoner is indeed an enemy combatant. The Act also provides for a Court of 
Military Commission Review, a special appellate-level court, with a three-member panel to 
review the decision of the commission. Additionally, the Act also provides further protection 
for detainees by confirming the provision in the DTA to allow an appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, despite the fact that the Act otherwise 
eliminates federal court jurisdiction over alien detainee petitions for habeas corpus. Lastly, 
the Act allows a further level of review by authorising the Supreme Court review, by 
certiorari, of the federal circuit court's decision.  
 
Therefore, despite criticisms, the procedures within the MCA are considered to be ―more 
protective of detainees' rights than was the case with any military commissions in American 
history.‖104 Moreover, although the Act prevents alien detainees from seeking immediate 
review of their detention, it does so by providing different levels of judicial review. In doing 
so, Congress and the Executive argue this legislation creates a viable constitutional balance 
between national security and civil liberties. 
 
The CSRT, however, expands the concept of enemy combatant to include anyone who 
belongs to al-Qaeda and associated groups. It also expands its applicability to the entire 
world, which reinforces the idea that US counter terrorism measures have global reach.  
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The MCA attempts to disregard judicial decisions which challenge the procedure of the 
CSRTs by relying on the idea of ‗enemy combatant‘. A decision by the Federal District Court 
in Washington in January 2005 had ruled that CSRTs violated two clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment.  This was because secret evidence obtained through torture was permitted, and 
detainees were refused legal access. Additionally, it was held that the vagueness of the term 
‗enemy combatant‘ permits the government to incriminate anyone who is in contact with a 
person or an organisation considered to be a terrorist.
105
 Thus, although the Supreme Court 
ruled in favour of detainees in Hamdi, Rasul and Hamdan, the effect of these have been 
subsequently limited by counter measures such as the DTA and the MCA.   
  
However, many believe such measures are warranted considering the exigencies of the 
situation. Geer argues that fear regarding the extent of presidential power is unwarranted, 
pointing out that those detained have provided adequate justifications for detention. He 
justifies the Government‘s decision to detain based on the concept of proportionality. He 
argues ―the power to detain is proportional with the expansion of danger during the War on 
Terror, and is actually curtailed compared with the power given to the President in prior 
conflicts.‖106  Also, Geer argues for courts to allow enemy combatants to challenge their 
status by an Article III review would be potentially harmful and damaging as the cases of 
Hamdi and Rasul taken in conjunction, provide the President with the requisite flexibility to 
prosecute the long-term war on terror, and to adequately protect the 290 million American 
citizens who justifiably demand protection from future terrorist attacks, and who have 
received that protection since September 12, 2001.
107
 
 
By allowing the President to exercise such power to counter anti-democratic goals of Al-
Qaeda, it is argued that he is subsequently protecting fundamental human rights of the public, 
particularly the right to life, and the rights to expression, religion and press. Failing to allow 
the President to do this, on the basis that the rights of detainees will be violated is inadequate 
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for some, who believe that rights of detainees, such as the right to legal access and due 
process, are insignificant and trivial in comparison to the right of life of millions of American 
citizens. However, Erwin Chemerinsky argues ―it cannot be that the president has the 
authority to detain American citizens apprehended in the United States for crimes committed 
in the United States without complying with the provisions of the Constitution.‖108 
Nevertheless, the courts have emphasised that ―core strategic matters of war making belong 
in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making 
them.‖109 Such a view was demonstrated by the initial decision in Boumediene v Bush. 110 
 
1.5 Legality of the Military Commissions Act  
 
The Bush administration subsequently experienced their first judicial victory since the 
passage of the MCA in Boumediene v Bush.
111
 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit confirmed that the Military Commissions Act prevents aliens 
detained at Guantanamo Bay from petitioning for habeas corpus.
112
 The issue before the 
Boumediene court was whether Federal Courts have jurisdiction over petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus filed by aliens captured abroad and detained as unlawful enemy combatants at 
Guantánamo. The detainees relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, which 
recognised the right of aliens to seek a writ of habeas corpus. The government, however, 
urged the court to recognise that Rasul was decided strictly on the basis of the habeas corpus 
statute then in place. The majority opinion, delivered by Judge A. Raymond Randolph, found 
that such changes in statute distinguished the Rasul decision from the issue before the court.   
 
The government believed this decision would prevent habeas petitions filed in Federal Courts 
from being heard and therefore limiting alien enemy combatants to challenging their 
detention in Federal Courts only after military proceedings and appeals therein. However, the 
detainees petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.   
 
The Supreme Court held that aliens designated as enemy combatants have the constitutional 
right to habeas corpus review in US Federal Courts. It also ruled that the CSRTs were 
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"inadequate". Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy maintained that ―the laws 
and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.‖113  
Reviewing the MCA, the Supreme Court held that section 7, which limited judicial review of 
Executive determinations of the petitioners‘ enemy combatant status, was unconstitutional. 
The court found that this did not provide an adequate habeas corpus substitute, and therefore 
acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
114
  
 
The failure of Congress ―to create an adequate substitute for habeas corpus,‖ led to the 
enactment of the Habeas corpus Restoration Act in 2007.
115
 This legislation repeals those 
provisions of the DTA and the MCA that eliminated the jurisdiction of any court to consider 
applications for a writ of habeas corpus filed by aliens designated as enemy combatants. It 
therefore restores statutory habeas corpus to enemy combatants, subject to limitations on 
habeas that pre-dated the DTA, e.g. the AEDPA which set a statute of limitations on habeas 
corpus claims. It also allows courts to consider legal challenges to military commissions only 
as provided by the UCMJ or by a habeas corpus proceeding. Thus the effect of such 
legislation may be of rhetorical significance only.   
 
1.6 Summary of US  
 
The balance between civil liberties and national security, particularly during times of war, 
remains a contentious issue. The fundamental rights which permit detainees‘ access to US 
courts to challenge the legality of their detention are often the rights which are partially or 
totally set aside when the nation is at war.  
 
Although suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is an 'exceptional' course of action, the 
preceding examples show that Congress has felt compelled to authorise the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus during times of indisputable and congressionally declared rebellion or 
invasion.  Suspension of the writ in such circumstances appears to satisfy two conditions. 
Firstly, each suspension has been performed by the Executive pursuant to express authority 
delegated by Congress in response to a state of ―rebellion‖ or ―invasion.‖116 Secondly, each 
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suspension was limited to the duration of that necessity.
117
 Therefore, such actions which 
have deprived civil liberties from those engaged in hostilities against the United States were 
justified on the basis that they were essential to protect the security of the nation.
118
 
 
Furthermore, history illustrates that actions during traditional wartime have traditionally 
involved temporarily overriding certain constitutional rights in the name of national security.  
Thus, actions such as suspending the writ and using military commissions existed only whilst 
hostilities lasted and the Rule of Law again prevailed when peace was restored. In contrast, 
the ‗war on terror‘ is much more complex. Whereas prior to 9/11, the writ has been 
specifically suspended and military commissions have been declared permissible by Congress 
and the judiciary, actions after 9/11 differ somewhat. For example, during the Civil War, 
Lincoln, albeit initially without Congressional authorisation, declared suspension of the writ 
in areas of paramilitary violence. In contrast, Bush attempted to strip individuals of this right 
with his decision to detain suspected terrorists outside the US and try them by military 
commissions. The fact that his decision to do so was subsequently successfully challenged is 
of little significance here; the point is that it was an indirect way of preventing individuals 
from petitioning to US courts.   
 
Furthermore, by declaring a war on terror, the US administration entered into unknown 
territory. Unlimited in time, scope and territory, the war on terror is unlike any other in global 
history. The war was declared in 2001 and has been ongoing since, with no end in sight. This 
means that some detainees could be deprived of their rights indefinitely. Also, the war was 
declared against terrorists, in particular al-Qaeda, and therefore not a specified nation. This 
again makes it difficult to predict when the war may end, particularly because there are many 
groups around the world which have been affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Although members of al-
Qaeda may be captured and detained, further members may join and newer more radical 
terrorist groups may emerge. This shows that the war is one which is undefined in scope and 
territory and, therefore, it is impossible to predict when the war may end.   
 
Moreover, as the methods employed by contemporary terrorists are inherently different to 
those employed by previous terrorists, counter-measures must be adequate to provide for the 
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modern threat. Historically, US anti-terrorism policy focused on deterring and punishing state 
sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups. However, the Patriot Act and subsequent legislation 
signifies an important shift in policy form deterrence to pre-emption and prevention.  
 
Other such practices which raise questions regarding whether the right is being inadvertently 
curtailed include the classification of detainees as ‗unlawful enemy combatants‘, and the use 
of military commissions. Although the Supreme Court decisions in Hamdi, Rasul and 
Hamdan ruled in favour of the petitioners, the DTA and MCA appear to overshadow these 
decisions. The DTA attempts to strip Federal Courts of their jurisdiction to hear habeas 
petitions from a person designated as an ‗enemy combatant‘, and the MCA specifically 
suspends habeas corpus for any person determined to be an ―unlawful enemy combatant." 
However, the DTA and MCA have received both international and judicial criticism and 
decisions by the Supreme Court have challenged the legality of certain provisions.  
 
Thus, United States history supports the assertion that true suspension of the writ depends 
wholly on the existence of the conditions, in conjunction with express congressional 
authorisation.
119
 Therefore, this assertion would suggest that since the United States is neither 
presently engaged in rebellion nor facing invasion, the actions taken by the Executive in the 
name of ‗the war on terror‘, such as the enactment of the DTA and MCA, do not constitute a 
legitimate suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.  
 
Some scholars question liberalists‘ parallel between those events and today's war on 
terrorism. "The Bush administration has done nothing like that," says Cass Sunstein, a liberal 
constitutional law professor at the University of Chicago. "This isn't to say that there are no 
legitimate criticisms. But by historical standards, it's been a pretty cautious response." 
Today's culture, he suggests, has become much more protective of civil liberties since the 
expanded definition of constitutional protections that followed the civil rights revolution of 
the 1960s. 
 
The administration's legal tactics have certainly received criticism. However, the Justice 
Department and its defenders argue that dramatic steps are needed because the threat is grave. 
Recognising the Constitutional rights relating to individual civil liberties, William Barr, the 
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former attorney general during the first Bush administration argued, ―Where you are dealing 
with extraordinary threats that could take tens of thousands of lives, a rule of reason has to 
prevail."
120
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120
 Cannon, A. (2003) ‗Taking Liberties‘, U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 134, Issue 16 
42 
 
2 
UK Anti Terrorism Legislation Pre and Post 9/11 
 
Having considered the approach of the US during times of war prior to 9/11 and the response 
thereafter, this section will consider the approach of the UK. The terror attacks on 7 July 2005 
in London were not the first attacks that Britain had faced as they have, for many years, been 
trying to adequately respond to the terrorist threat posed by the IRA. Thus, it is important to 
consider whether pre-existing legislation was considered adequate to deal with pending 
attacks to the UK after 9/11 and 7/7. 
 
Furthermore, comparison between the two nations allows the reader to identify any 
differences between the approach of the US and the UK, and allows the reader to draw 
conclusions concerning lessons one country can learn from the successes and failures of the 
other in their continuing struggle to achieve a viable and legitimate constitutional balance 
between prevailing interpretations of national security and civil liberties.  
 
The previous section considered measures adopted by the US to deal with threats posed. This 
section will explore two main issues. Firstly, anti-terrorism legislation which was enacted 
during the 1970‘s will be examined. It considers methods used to contain paramilitary 
violence, such as internment and the use of Diplock courts, and the view of the ECtHR 
regarding whether detention without trial was ‗strictly within the exigencies of the 
situation‘.121 The section discusses the Terrorism Act 2000, which for the first time 
introduced permanent anti-terrorism legislation. The Act is particularly contentious due to its 
revised definition of terrorism.  
 
Secondly, the section considers national security concerns in the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 
attacks, and thus, the enactment of further anti-terrorism legislation. This includes the Anti 
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and the 
Terrorism Act 2006. The provisions contained within these Acts, and the Counter Terrorism 
Act 2008, will be discussed, with reference to case law. This will identify areas in which 
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powers have been enhanced and whether any extraordinary measures, previously unheard of, 
have been adopted.   
 
By considering actions in the UK, it will be possible to identify similarities and differences in 
the approaches of the two countries and assess the implications. For example, the approach of 
the UK may differ in some respects due to its obligations under the European Convention of 
Human Rights.   
 
2.1 Anti-terrorist measures prior to 9/11 
Attacks by paramilitary organisations have been prevalent throughout the UK for decades. 
Serious threats were posed by the IRA, particularly in the 1970‘s and so the UK government 
was compelled to adopt measures to ensure the safety of its nation and citizens. Therefore, the 
threat posed by terrorists is not a new phenomenon within the UK and it would appear that 
the nation would be somewhat more prepared than the US.   
 
(i) Prevention of Terrorism Acts 
 
In 1974, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act re-enacted provisions 
contained in the 1939 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act. This included 
enhanced powers relating to detention, entry, and search and seizure. Also, whereas prior 
legislation was confined to Northern Ireland, such measures widened the scope to include 
related terrorist violence within Britain.   
 
The legislation also included proscription of organisation and vested in the Home Secretary 
the power to issue exclusion orders. Most significantly, the legislation allowed the arrest of 
individuals without a warrant and on reasonable suspicion that they were guilty of an offence. 
It also extended police powers by allowing suspects to be held for questioning for forty eight 
hours, and for a further five days on the issuing of a Detention Order by the Home 
Secretary.   
 
Despite posing a significant challenge to civil liberties, such provisions, 
although ―unprecedented in peacetime,‖ were considered as vital for the emergency.122 They 
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remained in force until they were replaced with the more permanent legislation, the Terrorism 
Act 2000.  
 
(ii) Internment 
 
The UK has also used the power of internment, which refers to the arrest and detention 
without trial of suspected terrorists. Authorised by the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 
(Northern Ireland) 1956 (SPA) Regulations, an internment order could be issued against a 
person suspected of acting in a manner prejudicial to either the preservation of the peace.
123
  
 
Internment was used to prevent individuals from further participation in paramilitary 
activities.
124
 The measure was justified with reference to the inability of the ordinary courts to 
restore peace and order and widespread witness intimidation,
125
 which made it difficult to 
find witnesses willing to testify in open court and rendered jury trial problematic.
126
 
 
However the crucial intelligence on which the success of the operation depended was flawed, 
leading to the detention of many individuals who were not involved in any paramilitary 
activity.
127
 Although preventative in conception, it proved punitive in 
exception.
128
 Additionally, the process appeared to operate on a discriminatory basis with far 
more Republicans detained than Loyalists.  
 
(iii) Lawless v Ireland 
 
However, the use of internment was challenged in Lawless v Ireland
129
 and in Ireland v 
United Kingdom.
130
 Although Lawless did not concern the UK, it is important as it considered 
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whether detention without trial was a violation of Article 5 of the ECHR; whether the 
government had lawfully derogated under Article 15(3)
131
; and whether the measure of 
detention without trial was ‗strictly within the exigencies of the situation.‘132  It was held that 
the derogation was lawful and detention without trial was ‗strictly within the exigencies of 
the situation‘. Therefore, internment was upheld as lawful.   
 
Ultimately, the matter involved two issues: (i) whether any less draconian methods than those 
adopted would have been sufficient to deal with the situation; (ii) whether the method 
employed was subject, so far as the situation allowed, to adequate safeguards to protect 
personal liberty.
133
  
 
It was held in both cases that such processes were a reasonable response to the circumstances, 
given the ―margin of appreciation.‖ The court in Lawless considered the ordinary processes 
of criminal law inadequate, particularly the difficulties of gathering sufficient evidence to 
secure conviction. Also, the Court rejected the alternative of closing the border on the 
Republic side due to the serious socio-economic repercussions. It also rejected setting up 
special criminal courts due to the inability to restore peace and order.
134
   
 
Internment was not used after 1975 and there were many claims for its repeal.
135
 However, 
the possibility of a drastic escalation in the level of violence suggests that, as a last resort, 
detention might be necessary to restore a modicum of order. Security may dictate the need to 
make provision for rapid reintroduction subject to prompt Parliamentary ratification.   
 
However, whether internment reduced the paramilitaries‘ potential for violence is highly 
debateable.
136
 Lord Gardiner acknowledged its possible effectiveness in the short term but 
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not as a long term strategy.
137
 Critics have argued that ―the primary sanction of such 
strategies is to deprive the suspect of their liberty.‖138 Preventative activities are not always 
effective however. Along with alienating communities who are vital to combating threats, 
such actions undermine the Rule of Law and judicial processes.
139
    
 
Moreover, the right to be free from arbitrary Executive detention is recognised by the right to 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. However, the UK government appeared to curtail this 
right with the introduction of Diplock courts.  
 
(iv) Diplock Courts 
 
Alternatives to internment were considered by Lord Diplock.
140
 This led to the establishment 
of Diplock courts,
141
 which consist of a single judge to try individuals. All three official 
reviews of the powers in Northern Ireland have considered trial by a single judge to be 
preferable to jury trials.
142
 Jury trials were considered as unsuitable due to fear of 
intimidation of jurors
143
 and the danger of partisan verdicts.
144
 The use of courts may have 
been more widely accepted if there were three judges instead of one.
145
   
 
The Diplock courts essentially created two different systems to try individuals, dependent on 
where the offence occurred: committing an offence in Britain would result in a trial by 
‗ordinary‘ courts, whereas committing the same offence in Northern Ireland would result in 
special procedures.  
 
The state has a duty to protect its nation and citizens and so the use of special courts may be 
necessary to deal with issues of jury and witness intimidation.  
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(v) Permanent powers - The Terrorism Act 2000 
 
The state‘s duty to protect the nation is further reflected by the Terrorism Act 2000. Replacing 
previous temporary anti terrorism legislation which dealt primarily with Northern Ireland, the 
Terrorism Act is far more significant in its nature. For the first time, it introduces provisions 
on a permanent basis.  The Act contains an extended list of proscribed terrorist organisations, 
and most significantly, allows police to detain suspects for up to seven days. This was 
extended to fourteen days by the Criminal Justice Act 2003
146
 and thereafter to twenty eight 
days by the Terrorism Act 2006.
147
 However, this has not subsequently been renewed in 2011 
and therefore, detention reverts back to 14 days under the CJA 2003.      
 
The Act‘s main innovation, however, is its new definition of ‗terrorism‘. Terrorism is defined 
as ‗the use or threat of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public 
or a section of the public for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological 
cause.‘148 The definition was further amended by the Terrorism Act 2006 to include action 
against international governments,
149
 and by the Counter Terrorism Act 2008 to include racial 
causes.
150
   
 
The new definition changes the objective stated in the previous definition, which was ‗the use 
of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear‘. In 
contrast, this new definition limits the scope by ensuring it does not encompass for example, 
acts of hooliganism, unrelated to any political end, or even individual acts of aggression.  
 
Nevertheless, the definition is significantly broader than its predecessor in many other 
respects. Firstly, the term ‗violence‘ is extended to include risks to property, safety, and 
interference with computer systems.
151
  Next, the motives of terrorism are made considerably 
greater by activities including, ‗influencing‘ the government, and further by including 
violence for religious, racial or ideological causes.   
 
It may be argued that ‗influence is too wide‘, particularly in relation to political actions under 
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Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR.
152
 There may also be problems with ‗religious or 
ideological‘ causes due to the extensive range of activities involved. For example, ‗religious‘ 
may be intertwined with personal disputes such as family disputes about an arranged 
marriage. Such a view was rejected by the government, however.
153
 Furthermore, single issue 
ideological campaigners such as ‗eco-terrorists‘ or anti-abortion groups, could also count as 
political campaigners rather than terrorists even if their main impact is upon private 
individuals, rather than the state.  
 
Despite assertions that s 1 is ‗practical and effective,‘154 the use of such a broad definition 
fails to focus on the key mischief of terrorism: the danger to political democracy. Instead, it 
allows for a whole range of activities, which may not actually be aimed at the state or 
sections of the public, for example, family disputes, as mentioned above. However, removing 
all references to motives would extend the special provisions to an over-broad range of 
circumstances.
155
   
 
Furthermore, the scope of the definition includes action outside the UK against foreign 
governments.
156
 Section 1 does not require that the government, towards which the prohibited 
action is influenced, be democratic or legitimately established, as confirmed in R v F
157
. Such 
measures make it possible to try any person who displays any violent action against any 
constituted government, no matter what the nature of the regime. There were unsuccessful 
attempts in Parliament to confine the foreign coverage of the Terrorism Act 2000 to 
‗designated countries‘ rather than regimes which might be viewed as ‗odious‘.158   
 
The broad context given under the definition is also contentious. There is little emphasis on 
the types of seriously threatening behaviours being perpetrated or the nature of the 
perpetrators, for example eco terrorists, anti-abortionists and white supremacists. Greater 
emphasis on such points would render less capable the ordinary criminal justice processes 
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and thereby justify special laws. Hence, measures which may be considered as 
‗draconian‘ would be limited to circumstances where ordinary policing and laws would not 
suffice.   
 
Further qualifications would therefore ensure that special measures offer a proportionate 
response. This is recognised by the government to some extent however, by the refusal to 
treat animal rights extremists as ‗terrorists‘ even though they fall within the definition.159   
 
However, the definition may encourage the occasional excess, and may set a significant 
precedent for comparable jurisdictions.
160
 On the other hand, the extended definition ensures 
the use of special measures for individuals inspired by groups such as Al-Qaeda. For 
example, the fact that the London attacks in July 2005 were commissioned by individuals 
deploying sophisticated techniques, with possible international support, raises elements of 
complexity which may defy the application of ordinary law.   
 
The Terrorism Act 2000 marked an important new phase in the laws against political violence 
within the UK. It launched a more unified and permanent regime. By changing the scope of 
the term ‗terrorism‘, the legislation provides for permanent measures to encompass many 
different types of activities for the purpose of achieving a political, religion or ideological 
cause. 
 
Interestingly, the Terrorism Act excludes the use of exclusion orders and the power of 
internment without trial, a measure common between 1971 and 1975.
161
 Also, there is no 
requirement for periodic renewal or re-enactment.
162
 Although this is logical, there is also 
little scrutiny of measures which substantially impair individual rights.   
 
Despite such measures, the UK enacted further provisions after the 9/11 attacks. Whether 
these measures are necessary depends on whether the tactics and methods used by the 
terrorists are inherently different to those employed by past terrorists.  
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2.2 Protecting national security after 9/11 in the UK 
In the US, the attacks of 9/11 prompted the passing of the Patriot Act and similarly, the UK 
government also responded by enacting and implementing anti-terrorism legislation, 
including the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), and thereafter the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). Further provisions were unveiled by the Terrorism 
Act 2006 and the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. Legislation struggled with further legal 
consequences of dealing with international terrorism, particularly because acts of terrorism 
extended beyond the battlefield and the use of sophisticated techniques created potential 
problems for detecting and gathering evidence.  
 
(i) Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 
 
The ATCSA came amongst a terrorist threat quite different from anything previously 
faced.
163
 Similarly to the US, the ATCSA authorised indefinite detention of foreigners 
suspected of terrorism, without either charge or conviction.
164
 Part IV has subsequently 
lapsed however. An array of limits and reviews were inserted, including a one-off review of 
the entire Act.
165
 The report by the Privy Counsellor Review Committee recommended the 
end of detention without trial as well as detailed changes in other areas.
166
   
 
Along with the lack of safeguards, for example in relation to the right to liberty under Article 
5 of the ECHR, the right to be free of discrimination under ECHR Article 14, and the 
significant risk of a violation of the right to respect for private life under Article 8, because of 
the range of offences covered,
167
 the legislation was also criticised for its failure to provide 
any protection against resident suspected terrorists. Moreover, it was stated that viable 
alternatives existed in the forms of either a more aggressive criminal prosecution stance or 
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intrusive administrative restraints.
168
 This included the use of telephone/email intercepts 
currently prohibited by section 17 of Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000.   
 
However, the government regarded Part IV as indispensable and the alternative strategies, 
specifically a legal framework both effective and compatible with the United Kingdom‘s 
human rights obligations including full compliance with Article 5 of the ECHR, as 
unworkable.
169
 In order to comply with the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), therefore, the 
government were required to invoke derogation under Article 15,
170
 because indefinite 
detention without charge or trial contravened Article 5 of the ECHR.
171
  
 
In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
172
 the House of Lords held that the laws 
do not grant any mandate permitting indefinite detention and thus issued a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA. The Court ruled that the measures taken were not 
―strictly required by the exigencies of the situation‖, and were contrary to Article 14 of the 
ECHR.
 173
 This was despite the fact that the state was considered to be amidst a war / public 
emergency.  Emphasising the need to uphold the Rule of Law, Lord Hoffman explained 
excessive measures which violated individual rights posed greater danger to ―the life of the 
nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political 
values‖ than terrorism itself. Lord Hoffman stressed terrorists aimed to undermine the 
fundamental principles of a democracy. Thus, the Executive resorting to measures potentially 
infringing individual rights challenge the long established values and principles of society, 
which ―is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve."174 This statement was received 
with enthusiasm by liberal groups but not by critics, who considered that it violated the rule 
that a Judge should not descend into politics, as this was ineffective irrational and 
discriminatory. 
 
(ii) Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
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Consequently, to avoid the need to derogate, the government enacted the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 which replaced Pt IV of the 2001 Act with Executive restriction by 
way of control orders.
175
  This empowers the Home Secretary to impose a control order ―if 
[s/he] (a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is … involved in 
terrorism-related activity; and (b) considers that it is necessary, to protect the public from a 
risk of terrorism.‖176   
 
Control orders are preventative orders that impose one or more obligations upon an 
individual. They are designed to prevent, restrict or disrupt involvement in terrorism-related 
activity, the orders are either derogating orders,
177
 involving house arrest, or non-derogating 
orders,
178
 which restrict the individual's movement. Although the control order may be 
contested, individuals subject to control orders may remain unaware of the allegations or 
evidence against them, which is similar to those detained by the US in Guantanamo Bay.  
 
Although the government sought to rely solely upon non-derogating orders, it has received 
condemnation for exceeding its limits in relation to the infringement of liberty and also in 
regard to the ‗thin veneer of legality‘ in the procedures by which orders can be 
challenged.
179
 Nevertheless, a decision by the House of Lords indicates that non-derogating 
control orders are, in principle, lawful.
 180
 However, too much restriction on liberty is a 
breach of Article 5.  
 
The PTA is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the ATCSA, the PTA applies to 
both British and non-British suspected terrorists. Thus, exceptional procedures have been 
extended to British citizens, something which the US has been unable or unwilling to 
do.
181
 Justification for this relies on the fact that the perpetrators of the 7/7 attacks were 
mostly British.  
 
Secondly, the use of control orders raises questions regarding suspension of law and habeas 
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corpus, thus the right to a fair trial, for all individuals, and significantly, the right to be free 
from arbitrary detention. Only the judge and ‗special attorneys‘ selected by the Home 
Secretary have access to the defendant‘s file, and special advocates are responsible for 
representing the view of the defence.  
 
This raises issues regarding independence, and suggests suspension of habeas corpus, 
particularly because the defendant is not present when the decision is made. Additionally, the 
making and enforcement of control orders is inconsistent with the right to a fair trial, which 
ensures the right to be informed promptly of the charges and the disclosure of evidence 
against the defendant. This was demonstrated in A v United Kingdom, where the court ruled 
that control orders were unlawful.  
 
Furthermore, the PTA affords greater weight to suspicion rather than fact by allowing 
individuals to be subjected to an order based on what the Home Secretary considers they 
could do in the future. This essentially criminalises possible future actions.  
 
The power vested in the Home Secretary raises questions about the role of the judiciary. 
Issues regarding who has the power to decide adequate measures to deal with a national 
emergency have been forthcoming throughout history and are still prevalent today. Although 
some believe the power undoubtedly lies with the Executive,
182
 common law jurisdictions 
such as that of the UK have a long standing tradition of Parliamentary and judicial control 
over the actions of the Executive.
183
   
 
However, on reaching the House of Lords, the court upheld the authority of the Home 
Secretary to detain individuals ―if he has reasonable cause to believe‖ the person to be of 
hostile origin or associations. Questions relating to this assertion of power by the Home 
Secretary are not new. In R v Secretary of State, Ex parte Hosenball,
184
Lord Denning‘s stated 
dictum that when there is a conflict between national security interests and freedom of an 
individual, ―the balance between these two is not for a court of law. It is for the Home 
Secretary."
185
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The courts have however stressed that national security is not so extensive as to warrant 
unnecessary infringements of rights. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it suggests 
individual rights may be curtailed to some extent to ensure national security. Secondly, it fails 
to draw a clear distinction between what rights may be infringed and in what circumstances. 
Some violation of rights may therefore be considered legitimate in times of emergency 
however what actually constitutes a national emergency is also unclear.   
 
Nevertheless, by introducing measures inconsistent with prior emergency powers, critics 
argue ―this law deliberately turns its back on the Rule of Law and establishes a new form of 
political regime.‖186 However, the unprecedented threat posed by terrorists inevitably requires 
different rules of law. Hence control orders are considered as an important tool to protect the 
public and their use has been considered as proportionate to the threat posed.
187
  
 
The idea of deviating from internationally recognised legislation during times of emergency 
was rejected by Lord Carlile however. Despite being of a minority opinion, Lord Carlile 
reiterated that ―in this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent…they speak the 
same language in war as in peace.‖188 The judgement by Lord Carlile emphasises the 
principle of the judiciary as guardians of the Rule of Law and thus, rejects Scmitt‘s claims 
regarding exclusive sovereignty without adversarial scrutiny.   
 
(iii) Terrorism Act 2006 
 
The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was adopted on 3 May 
2005 and signed by the UK on 16 May 2005. Its purpose was ―to enhance the efforts of the 
Parties in preventing terrorism and its negative effects on the full enjoyment of human 
rights…‖189   
 
Article 5 requires States to criminalise ―public provocation to commit a terrorist offence‖. 
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However, the scope of an offence must be restricted in two ways. Firstly, there must be a 
specific intention to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, and, secondly, the message 
to the public must cause a danger that such offences may be committed.
190
 Article 12 further 
requires states to respect relevant human rights obligations.
191
  
 
To comply with these obligations, and amidst the aftermath of the London bombings, the 
Terrorism Act 2006 was enacted. The legislation introduced offences designed to avert or 
penalise extremist messages or preparatory activities. These offences did already exist in 
some form however, for example sections 55, 57 and 58 of the TA 2000. For example, section 
55 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides for an offence of instructing and training another, or 
receiving instruction or training, in the making or use of firearms, explosives or chemical, 
biological or nuclear weapons. The offence includes recruitment for training that is to take 
place outside the UK. Section 57 further criminalises possession of an article for a purpose 
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. Moreover, 
Section 58 proscribes collecting or recording information of a kind likely to be useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or possessing a document or record 
containing information of that kind.  
 
Section 1 criminalises publication of statements that are ‗likely to be understood by some or 
all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement 
or other inducement to them in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism‘.192   
 
The offence of ―indirect encouragement‖ has been controversial, which includes a statement 
that ‗glorifies‘ acts of terrorism, a statement from which people can ―reasonably‖ infer that 
they should emulate the conduct being glorified.
193
 ‗Glorification‘ includes ‗any form of 
praise or celebration‘.194 For the offences to be committed, the publisher must either intend 
members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or be subjectively reckless 
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about this.
195
 Hence, it is no defence under s 1(5)(b) to show that the dissemination fell on 
deaf ears.  
 
The ordinary law of criminal encouragement in Part II of the Serious Crime Act 2007 
requires the encouragement of an act which would amount to one or more offence and at least 
with the belief that one or more offences would be committed as a consequence. Section 1 
expands this further in two ways.   
 
The first way relates to direct incitement, the scope of which is made wider by specifying that 
it is an offence ‗to incite people to engage in terrorist activities generally‘  and extra-
territorially. Secondly, for indirect incitement, it is an offence to incite them obliquely by 
creating the climate in which they may come to believe that terrorist acts are acceptable‘ such 
as glorification or otherwise.  
 
Thus, the scope is very broad and the overall impact is to criminalise generalised and public 
encouragement of terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2000 creates offences relating to the objective 
of the perpetrator, specifically the aim of putting pressure on a government. In contrast, the 
Terrorism Act 2006 calls into question the possibility of expressing a political opinion that the 
government considers unacceptable. Its provisions ―focus completely on the realm of mere 
possibility.‖196 Moreover, the application of these offences in the context of foreign regimes 
(by reference to s 17)
197
 has caused debates about whether supporting the armed opposition to 
Apartheid in South Africa constitutes terrorism.‖198   
 
The Joint Committee therefore concluded that the definition ―carries with it a considerable 
risk of incompatibility with the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 
ECHR.‖199 Moreover, the breadth of the definition of ―terrorism‖, the vagueness of 
―glorification‖,200 and the lack of a requirement that there be at least a danger that an act of 
terrorism will result, is likely to have a disproportionate impact on freedom of expression, 
                                                 
195
 Ibid Section 1(2)(b) 
196
 Paye, J. C. (2007) Global War on Liberty, (Telos Press Publishing), page 98 
197
 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2005) Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and 
Related Matters (HL Paper 75/HC 561), para 12. 
198
 House of Commons Debates (2005) Bob Marshall-Andrews, vol. 438, col. 844 (2 November 2005). 
199
 Joint Committee on Human Rights (2007) The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 
First Report of Session (HL Paper 26/HC 247, 22 January 2007). 
200
Joint Committee on Human Rights (2005) Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and 
Related Matters (HL Paper 75/HC 561), para 7. 
57 
 
contrary to the express requirement in Article 12 of the HRA.
201
  
 
Nevertheless, the Government maintains that the offence rightly criminalises the activities of 
those who seek to encourage acts of terrorism.
202
 However statutory alternatives to 
circumscribe extreme speech do exist.   
 
Part II of the Terrorism Act 2000 for example, deals with incitements of terrorism 
abroad.
203
 This was invoked, for instance, against Younis Tsouli.
204
 Moreover, Abu Izzadeen 
was convicted of terrorist fundraising and inciting terror abroad but cleared of encouraging 
terrorism.
205
 Additionally, section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1981 criminalises 
the solicitation of murder,
206
 and lesser offences may be adequately dealt with as public order 
offences.
207
   
 
This possibility of alternative charges was illustrated by the conviction of Mohammed Atif 
Siddique under the 2006 Act. Although he was convicted of collecting and distributing 
terrorist propaganda, Siddique was also convicted of more serious offences
208
 under the 
Terrorist Act 2000. This included weapons training (section 54), possession of articles for 
purposes of terrorism (section 57), and collection of information (section 58).   
 
Additionally, the 2006 Act permits pre-charge detention for up to 28 days. This is 
considerably longer than that of any other ECHR Member State, and the US, which tends to 
―greatly undermine the claim that it is necessary and proportionate.‖209 Attempts to extend 
this to 42 days in the Counter Terrorism Bill 2008 were rejected by Parliament. However, as 
noted above, pre-charge detention has reverted back to 14 days as provided for by the CJA 
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2003. 
  
(iv) Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
 
The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 widens existing legal tactics and is motivated by familiar 
themes that the threat is ‗very different in nature and scale‘ and intervention is needed ‗at a 
very early stage‘.210   
 
Part I enhances powers to gather and share information, especially by allowing the retention 
and use of fingerprints and DNA samples for counter-terrorism as well as criminal purposes. 
Many criminal justice measures were incorporated to balance the rejection of 42 day 
detention, including post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects and the drawing of adverse 
inferences from silence. There is also imposition of requirements on people convicted of 
terrorist offences to let authorities know where they are living and any changes to their 
circumstances. Additionally there is enhanced sentencing of offenders who commit offences 
with a terrorist connection; and provision for inquests to be heard without a jury. The Act fails 
to provide a review scheme however.  
 
2.3 Summary of UK 
After 9/11 the British Government decided that the threat of terrorism in Britain was such as 
to amount to a public emergency threatening the life of the nation and purported, on that 
ground to derogate from the Convention.   Relying on this derogation, the British Parliament 
passed the first of many further anti-terrorism legislation, in the form of the ATCSA. This 
was followed by numerous anti-terrorism legislation, applicable both to British and non-
British citizens.  
 
Most significantly, the threat of terrorism to the UK has been prevalent for many years prior 
to 9/11 and anti-terrorist legislation already existed to deal with these. Also, although the UK 
enacted anti-terrorist legislation after 9/11, the attacks in London on 7th July 2005 appeared 
to suggest the inadequacy of the current measures and therefore, led to further anti-terrorist 
legislation.  
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Although many have criticised the enactment of further anti-terrorist legislation, Lord 
Goldsmith, (the UK Attorney General from 2001 to 2007), stressed that, ―things have 
changed: in scale, in the methods and aspirations of the terrorist and in the way that 
terrorism is conducted with modern technology and with suicide bombs. These have all 
changed the landscape of terrorism.‖211 Thus, the threats are not of the same nature as those 
mentioned above prior to 9/11 and so it may be argued that further legislation to combat 
terrorism was necessary despite the existing permanent provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000. 
 
Like that of the US, UK anti-terrorist legislation also involved measures which restricted the 
right to a writ of habeas corpus. Such measures were considered necessary to restore peace 
and to overcome problems such as witness and jury intimidation and further paramilitary 
violence. Furthermore, the UK took remarkable action by introducing permanent measures by 
way of the Terrorism Act 2000, which most significantly, authorises pre charge detention for 
up to seven days.   
 
Nevertheless, despite such measures, the UK felt it necessary to introduce further measures 
after 9/11. As the UK had used internment during the 1970s, again the Executive attempted to 
legislate for detention without charge and conviction. However, these measures were 
subsequently declared incompatible with the ECHR.
212
 Despite this, the UK overcame this 
setback by introducing control orders, which are imposed at the discretion of the Home 
Secretary and can involve many restrictions on liberty.    
 
The anti-terrorist measures adopted by the UK have primarily focused on increasing the 
number of days of pre-charge detention and also the use of control orders to restrict the 
movements of individuals. However, pre-charge detention for up to 28 days is considerably 
longer than that of any country, including the US which suggests that its use is greatly 
unnecessary and disproportionate.
213
   
 
Interestingly, the UK government have not introduced special courts or commissions to try 
suspected terrorists, as it had done so previously with the use of Diplock courts. Thus, the UK 
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have attempted to deal with suspected terrorists by using the criminal courts as far as possible 
and not automatically resorting to a level of prosecution below that used in normal times. 
This shows that the UK believes many of its existing measures are adequate to deal with 
terrorist threats. Nevertheless, certain measures such as indefinite detention provisions and 
control orders are exceptions to the idea that the UK has adopted a totally criminal justice 
approach in dealing with suspected terrorists.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
After discussing the measures adopted by both the UK and the US, it is possible to draw 
similarities and differences between the approaches of the two countries. The range of 
measures adopted post 9/11 is significant. In both countries, the powers of the police and 
intelligence services have been enhanced, in relation to for example, pre-charge detention and 
interception powers.
214
   
 
Whereas the US introduced temporary legislation, subject to review and renewal, the UK has 
enacted legislation such as the Terrorism Act 2000, which incorporates emergency provisions 
into criminal law on a permanent basis. Although this was enacted prior to 9/11, it was a 
result of the increased threat from international terrorism. This is indicative of a system 
whereby the exception becomes the norm and the norm becomes the exception.  
 
The use of military commissions in the US, and that of Diplock courts in the UK, 
demonstrates how those involved in hostilities against the state have traditionally been 
afforded less protection than ordinary criminals. Both military commissions and Diplock 
courts refute the idea of the right to trial by jury. In both instances, the defence is prevented 
from preparing a successful defence, primarily to the withholding of information relating to 
the charges or allegations.  
 
The US administration opted to use military commissions to try suspected terrorists after 
9/11. The UK, in contrast, has used the ordinary court system to try suspects.  This ensures 
the right to a ‗fair trial‘ is retained and also that the actions of the Executive remain open to 
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adversarial scrutiny. However, as mentioned above, those subject to control orders are not 
subject to the ordinary criminal justice system. Thus, such measures are an exception to the 
UK‘s general approach of using the ordinary courts for suspected terrorists. 
 
The most striking measures are those relating to detention. The AUMF and Patriot Act have 
authorised the US Executive to indefinitely detain foreigners. Although the UK attempted to 
do this in the ATCSA 2001, it was subsequently ruled as contrary to the ECHR. Nevertheless, 
the UK has, in essence, introduced the concept of indefinite detention in the PTA 2005 by 
way of control orders. Although this differs from the method employed by the US, it 
nevertheless has the same consequences.   
 
The US Patriot Act and the ATCSA, enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, are based on the 
existence of a double legal system, where there is protection of the law for citizens, and 
suspension of the law for foreigners. Although this is discriminatory, states have traditionally 
protected the rights of their citizens to an enhanced standard. This idea of a dual legal system 
begins to disappear with the Patriot II and PTA 2005. Despite attempts to extend provisions to 
include citizens under the Patriot II, the US operates as a double judicial system of ordinary 
law for criminals and exceptional law for suspected terrorists. The PTA, in contrast, has 
extended exceptional measures to include citizens. This therefore extends the suspension of 
habeas corpus to the whole population, encompassing all individuals regardless of 
nationality. This is again indicative of ‗a generalised state of exception.‘  
 
This is further evidenced by the use of pre-trial detention in the UK. Initially, limited to 
fourteen days, police powers have been extended to allow detainees to be detained without 
charge for up to twenty eight days. The government has claimed this is insufficient however 
Parliament has rejected attempts to extend this further.   
 
Contrary to claims by the Home Secretary, these exceptional procedures are significantly 
different to those applied in matters of terrorism by countries such as Spain or Germany. In 
these countries, long-term preventative detention is exclusively ordered by a judge, the 
detainee is aware of the charges and the defence has the possibility of contesting the evidence 
or the reasons for the detention.  
 
However, justification for the ongoing need of antiterrorism legislation can be answered at 
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three levels.
215
 Firstly, there is a state responsibility to act in order to safeguard the protective 
right to life of citizens.
216  Therefore, in principle, it is justifiable for liberal democracies to be 
empowered to defend their nation, as their first priority is ‗to ensure the security and safety of 
the nation and all members of the public.‘217   
 
The use of exceptional measures has long been recognised as a legitimate reaction to ―clear 
and present dangers‖. This is illustrated by the ECHR, particularly by Article 17, which 
prohibits engagement in any activity aimed at the destruction of rights and freedoms, and the 
power of derogation in times of emergency threatening the life of the nation under Article 15. 
Protecting the security and democratic way of life of a state is essential therefore; however, 
this must not wholly subsume other values such as individual rights.   
 
Secondly, exceptional laws are justified on the basis that in a democracy, terrorism is an 
illegitimate form of political expression. This is because terrorism is considered as a form of 
political violence. As violence typically involves the use or threatened use of coercion 
resulting, or intended to result in, the death, injury, restraint, or intimidation of persons or the 
destruction of seizure of property, it is illegitimate and therefore criminal in nature.
218
 
Therefore, due to the manner in which terrorists fight their cause, one which results in the 
deaths of many, it is considered an illegitimate form of expression.  
 
Thirdly, terrorism is a different type of criminal activity due to its structure, targets, and 
sophisticated techniques. It therefore requires a response above that of the ‗normal‘ law, for 
example a change in detection and processes within the criminal justice system. ―Just as 
variation has been adopted against, for example, rapists, serious fraudsters, and drug 
traffickers,‖219 similarly terrorists may demand ―variant treatment because of their atypical 
organisation, methods, and targets.‖220  
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However such laws can be problematic.
221
 They are considered as unnecessary adjuncts to 
‗normal‘ laws relating to police powers, such as those in the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, and regular criminal offences. Also, excessive use may engender abuses, both by 
the Executive and police and security forces. Such laws may also damage the country‘s 
international reputation if they are inconsistent with globally recognised legislation, 
particularly with regards to protecting fundamental individual rights.
222
 Moreover, the need to 
respond promptly and decisively can produce ‗panic‘ legislation, ill-considered and 
ineffective in practice. However, such reactive legislation, such as the AUMF and the ATCSA 
may be necessary temporarily due to the lengthy procedures involved in enacting in-depth 
legislation.   
 
Also, ‗emergency‘ laws may be implemented beyond the original emergency, causing 
difficulties in reasserting laws of normality. However, Lincoln‘s actions after the Civil War 
indicate that the normal Rule of Law can be redeemed when an emergency ceases to exist.  
 
Additionally, a libertarian perspective would argue that times of emergency pose a great 
threat to individual rights, which are often considered as obstacles to public safety. 
Exceptional powers are controversial as they tend to target suspect communities, causing 
discontent and dissatisfaction, for example, among young Muslim males.
223
 The targeting of 
suspect communities therefore weakens community relations with the police and hinders the 
identification and detection of terrorists by encouraging sympathy for their cause and a 
reduction of voluntary assistance.   
 
Measures adopted by both countries, including indefinite detention and pre-trial detention, 
directly violate civil liberties. Such processes rebut the presumption of innocence that is 
normally granted to persons prosecuted within a judicial context. It would be a reasonable 
development if governments were able to rely primarily on ‗normal‘ policing powers and its 
extensive contingency planning and networks. However, due to the perception that the 
security of the nation and the democratic way of life is greatly threatened, exceptional powers 
may remain for a considerable period of time.   
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However, the meaning and scope of individual rights are not self-evident or historically fixed 
and it is difficult to achieve a balance between the rights to live in a democratic society free 
from terrorist attacks, for example boarding a train or a plane without fear of attack, with the 
need to uphold the Rule of Law and protect individual rights. States have a duty to ensure 
security, however there are various conceptions as to what ‗security‘ means. Nevertheless, if 
security requires that some rights are curtailed for the greater good of the security of all 
citizens, then there should be great emphasis upon regulation and review of exceptional laws 
to ensure their existence is limited to only what is necessary and proportionate.  
 
To achieve a viable and constitutional balance between national security and civil liberties is 
extremely difficult and the actions of Executive, legislature and the judiciary illustrate the 
continuous struggle to do so. The Executive believe they are, as democratically elected 
members, responsible for ensuring the national security of the nation and its citizens. It is 
therefore argued that the best way in which to resolve issues between national security and 
civil liberties is to defer to the Executive on such matters. This would afford great power and 
discretion to the Executive in dealing with perceived terrorist threats, without the need to be 
held accountable by the judiciary. This may be beneficial, for example, in cases where 
individuals are detained as a result of information gained from secret intelligence sources. If 
the courts demanded disclosure of such sources and thereafter considered them as 
impermissible, the intelligence agencies would be forced to abide by the rules of law but this 
may be detrimental if the threat posed by the terrorist was substantial, regardless of how the 
information was obtained.  
 
This reaffirms Schmitt‘s view that the President / Prime Minister, as Commander in Chief, is 
totally sovereign and therefore not answerable to any branch, such as the judiciary or 
Parliament regarding actions which involve securing the nation. Thus, such commentators 
suggest that the balance between national security and civil liberties should be decided by the 
Executive alone and therefore challenges to the courts on such matters, should result in the 
judiciary applying the principle of judicial deference. However courts have also reaffirmed 
their duty to protect individual rights.
224
 This is discussed further in the following chapter.  
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3 
Judicial Determinations on National Security 
 
Having explored the counter-terrorism measures in both the US and the UK, this chapter 
considers whether issues regarding national security are subject to scrutiny by the judiciary or 
whether the judiciary should defer to the Executive on such matters.  The chapter first 
considers the traditional approach of the courts in determining cases relating to national 
security, and thereafter, considers whether judges have retreated from such an approach. This 
is discussed first in relation to the US and thereafter the UK. 
 
The law is determined as much by judicial interpretation of precedent and statutes as it is by 
statutes themselves. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse long term trends and changes as 
predictors of judicial reactions to current and future cases even under as yet unknown future 
statutes. Judicial reactions to statutory measures are as important as the principles of law 
themselves, as they are subject to and dependent on interpretation and thus, it is important to 
consider the patterns of law. Statutes and precedents can be interpreted in a national security 
way or civil liberties.  Fundamentally, this chapter considers whether a balance can be 
achieved between the two in both the US and the UK?   
 
National security is an evolving concept, dependent on the perception of the nature of the 
threats posed to the nation and its citizens. Although protecting the nation is at the heart of 
any country‘s government, there are always consequences regarding the way in which 
measures enacted and implemented to protect national security may affect civil 
liberties. Conflicts regarding how and where to strike the balance of national securities and 
civil liberties are not new, particularly during times of war and emergencies.  
 
The Executive often argue that where issues of national security arise, the judiciary should 
defer to the Executive on such matters and, therefore, not rule on such issues. However, 
counter arguments maintain that the role of the judiciary is to strictly uphold a liberal 
interpretation of the Rule of Law, and therefore to leave Executive action unquestioned would 
potentially lead to ‗arbitrary‘ Executive measures.  
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Although judges are governed by prior precedent and cases can sometimes be resolved with 
appeals to text and precedent, there are ―open areas‖ in the law, where neither text nor 
precedent commands a result.
225
 It is in such areas that there is no ‗right‘ answer and 
therefore, it is possible to reach many different reasonable outcomes. Thus, decisions 
―inevitably reflect judges‘ moral values, institutional preferences, personal ideologies, and 
emotional dispositions.‖226 Such issues are prevalent in legal conflicts concerning how to 
establish a viable balance between national security and civil liberties, which can be partly 
attributed to the relative infrequency of such cases. Therefore, judges both in the UK and the 
US often find themselves in a difficult and unknown situation when they are called upon to 
resolve these issues.   
 
3.1 United States  
 
The difficulty in striking the correct balance between national security and civil liberties is 
demonstrated by the actions of the US government to indefinitely detain individuals after 
9/11. The Court in Hamdi and Rasul failed to directly address questions regarding the 
legitimacy of the government to detain individuals and classify them as ‗enemy combatants‘. 
The Supreme Court was faced with such issues for the first time, and there was no precedent 
for the Court to adhere to a particular result. It is therefore not surprising that because the 
Supreme Court had failed to address this issue, subsequent decisions by the US District 
courts differed in their approaches.
227
  
 
In the United States, therefore, ―the struggle between the needs of national security and 
political or civil liberties has been a continual one.‖228 It is therefore important to consider 
the historical actions of the judiciary in dealing with such conflicts. Notably, during the 
American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln attempted to suppress ‗treacherous‘ behaviour by 
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suspending habeas corpus, due to the belief ―that the nation must be able to protect itself in 
war against utterances which actually cause insubordination.‖229   
  
Also, prior to the US entering WWI, President Woodrow Wilson ―predicted a dire fate for 
civil liberties should we become involved.‖230 This prediction was realised with the passage of 
the Espionage Act 1917
231
 and the Sedition Act 1918.
232
 Thereafter, World War II led to 
Executive orders providing for internment of Japanese Americans,
233
 and the Vietnam War 
was accompanied by government efforts to silence war protests.
234
 Most significantly, and as 
already discussed, the declaration of a ‗war on terror‘ by the Bush administration in 2001, led 
to the adoption of many new measures, including indefinite detention of detainees and the use 
of military commissions.   
 
During the Civil War, Lincoln famously suspended the writ of habeas corpus, thereby 
allowing American citizens to be arrested by the military without recourse to the 
judiciary.
235
 Chief Justice Taney held in Ex parte Merryman
236
 that Lincoln had acted beyond 
his Presidential powers, and that it was ―one of those points of constitutional law upon which 
there was no difference of opinion‖ that the Constitution specifically reserves the power to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus to Congress alone.
237
 Thereafter, in Ex Parte 
Milligan,
238
 the Supreme Court held it is unconstitutional, regardless of congressional 
authorisation, to try civilians in military tribunals when the civilian courts are open. However, 
although some commentators have claimed that the core holding of Milligan remains 
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undisturbed,
239
 most scholars now recognise that Milligan is ―confined between the covers of 
constitutional history books. The decision itself has had little effect on history.‖240  
 
Thereafter, in two of the most notable times in history, in which national security arguments 
directly clashed with civil liberties, judges adopted a logical approach of presumption and 
thus assumed that the actions of the Executive were constitutional when they had acted in the 
name of national security.   
 
Firstly, the Court was consistent in its approach and upheld many convictions of individuals 
who had expressed opposition during World War I.
241
 For example, Rose Pastor Stokes, the 
editor of the socialist Jewish Daily News, was sentenced to ten years in prison for the 
publication in the Kansas City Star of the following statement: ―I am for the people, while the 
government is for the profiteers.‖242 The Reverend Clarence H. Waldron was also sentenced 
to fifteen years in prison for distributing a pamphlet stating that ―if Christians are forbidden 
to fight to preserve the Person of their Lord and Master, they may not fight to preserve 
themselves, or any city they should happen to dwell in.‖243 
 
These decisions made it clear that the Court‘s position that ―while the nation is at war 
serious, abrasive criticism . . . is beyond constitutional protection.‖244 This was further 
emphasised by the court in Schenck. The court maintained that ―when a nation is at war many 
things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their 
utterance will not be endured...‖245  
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However, the end of the war bought with it recognition that the Espionage Act had been 
excessive and the Supreme Court recognised injustices had occurred in the name of national 
security during wartime. The Supreme Court subsequently overruled the WWI decisions, 
recognising that it had failed to protect constitutional rights during wartime.
246
   
 
Rejecting the ―clear and present danger‖ justification for curtailment of First 
Amendment
247
 rights during World War I, Justice Douglas insisted there was ―no place in the 
regime of the First Amendment for any "clear and present danger" test.‖ Explaining that 
―great misgivings are aroused‖ when the test is used, Justice Douglas explained that the 
―threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to 
the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous.‖ He further explained that although 
he ―doubts if the "clear and present danger" test is congenial to the First Amendment in times 
of a declared war, I am certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of 
peace.‖ He added, apart from rare instances, where speech is brigaded with action, ―speech 
is, I think, immune from prosecution.‖248  
 
The Second World War cases also illustrate great judicial deference to the Executive. In Ex 
parte Quirin,
249
 the Court affirmed President Roosevelt‘s determination that eight German 
saboteurs were ―unlawful combatants‖ who should be tried in military tribunals. However the 
court rejected the government‘s argument that the courts were to review the President‘s 
determination.   
 
One year later, the Court considered the constitutionality of a military regulation that imposed 
a time curfew on all Americans of Japanese ancestry.
250
 Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, 
writing for the majority, held that ―the war power of the national government is the power to 
wage war successfully.
251
 In effect, Hirabayashi held that when a decision of the political 
branches involves military imperatives, ―it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom 
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of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs,‖ even when the decision openly and 
obviously eliminates a right guaranteed to the people by the Constitution.
252
 Thereafter, 
following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
authorised the Army to designate military areas from which persons of Japanese ancestry 
should be evacuated and sent to internment camps.
253
 Approximately 120,000 people of 
Japanese ancestry were interned, despite assertions that the demand for mass evacuation was 
based on ―public hysteria‖ rather than on fact.254   
 
Despite this, following the ‗logical‘ presumption for dealing with conflicts between civil 
liberties and national security, the Supreme Court upheld the President‘s decision of mass 
internment in Korematsu v. United States.
255
  Once again, the Court overlooked questions of 
race discrimination and racial profiling and the absence of any suspicion that Korematsu was 
disloyal.  Justice Black explained they were aware of the hardships imposed, ―but hardships 
are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.‖256  Therefore, it was accepted that 
exceptional measures are necessary in times of war, despite the hardships caused to 
individuals by such measures.  
 
However, after WWII, opinions regarding internment began to change and in 1976, President 
Gerald Ford observed that the evacuation and internment of loyal Japanese American citizens 
was wrong.
257
 Additionally in 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties 
Act.
258
 This officially declared the Japanese internment as a ―grave injustice‖ and offered an 
official presidential apology and reparations to each of the Japanese American internees who 
had suffered discrimination, loss of liberty, loss of property, and personal humiliation because 
of the actions of the US government.
259
 The decision in Korematsu has never been cited 
thereafter by the Supreme Court and it has, over the years, become a ―constitutional 
pariah.‖260  
                                                 
252
 Ibid at 93. 
253
 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) 
254
 Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director of FBI, to Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney Gen., quoted in  
Whitehead, D., The FBI Story: A Report To The People 189 (1956). 
255
 Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
256
 Ibid. at 219, 223-24 
257
 Proclamation No. 4417, ―An American Promise,‖ 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (Feb. 19, 1976). 
258
 Civil Liberties Act 1988 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (2000). 
259
 Ibid  app. §§ 1989-1989a. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 authorised a payment of $20,000 to each surviving 
internee. Barkan, E. (2000) The Guilt Of Nations: Restitution And Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press) 30-31. 
260
 Hutchinson, D. J. (2002) ‗―The Achilles Heel‖ of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese 
71 
 
 
Therefore, the traditional level of judicial deference is in part a result of structural 
assumptions derived from the US Constitution. Congress and the Executive are jointly 
charged with conducting foreign and military affairs,
261
 and the judiciary has generally 
assumed that these branches of the government are best placed to make judgments on, 
amongst other issues, matters relating to national security threats, including judgments as to 
the existence of a threat. Therefore, the President, as Commander in Chief, is afforded 
particular deference regarding matters affecting the security of the nation.  
 
However, decisions such as Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu illustrate that in hindsight, 
the courts approach has had retrospective disastrous effects. Although they were considered 
as necessary during the war, the decisions are regarded as constitutional failures and they 
illustrate that deference to the government on issues of national security has often led courts 
to uphold government actions which in hindsight appeared unjustified.
262
 Moreover, there 
have been numerous cases in which the government has knowingly misrepresented the nature 
of the threat to the courts. For example, in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 
it later became apparent that US officials had knowingly misinformed the court about 
evidence relating to the danger of Japanese Americans.
263
 More recently, several prosecutions 
by the Bush administration of suspected terrorists have failed due to the fact that prosecutors 
exaggerated the evidence.
264
   
 
(i) Deference in modern times  
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The logical presumption of judicial deference appears to have been increasingly rejected by 
US courts in recent times. There have been numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has 
had to consider the constitutional balance between national security and civil liberties, 
somewhat analogous to the issues involved in Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu.  The 
following cases show that the Court abstained from the traditional level of judicial deference 
typically afforded in such circumstances.  
 
Two Vietnam War cases concerning the First and Fourth Amendments respectively were the 
initial indication of a change of approach by the courts.   In New York Times Co. v. United 
States,
265
 the government attempted to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers, a top secret 
study of the Vietnam War that had been made available to the newspapers ―through an 
unprecedented breach of security.‖266 The government argued publication would grievously 
harm national security.  
 
In a 6-3 ruling, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the government‘s national security 
claim, ruling that the government could not constitutionally enjoin the publication.
267
 Justice 
Black observed that the ―word ‗security‘ is a broad, vague generality whose contours should 
not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment.‖268 Justice 
Stewart further insisted that the government could not constitutionally enjoin the publication 
because it had failed to prove that disclosure ―will surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation.‖269 Therefore, the onus was placed on the government to 
prove that disclosure would be harmful to the nation. This directly contrasts previous 
judgments where courts have accepted that the Executive are best placed to decide whether 
ones actions pose a risk to the nation, without the need for any substantial proof.  
 
Thereafter, the Court considered claims by President Nixon regarding exemption from the 
ordinary requirements of the Fourth Amendment when undertaking national security 
investigations. The government specifically claimed the President must be free to engage in 
national security wiretaps without the warrant and probable cause requirements. This 
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contention was unanimously rejected in United States v. U.S. District Court.
270
 The court held 
that the President has no constitutional authority to wiretap citizens without a judicially 
issued search warrant based upon probable cause. This included investigations involving the 
national security of the nation.
271
  
 
The court recognised that the President has a constitutional responsibility to protect the 
nation. However they recognised that because Executive branch officials are charged with 
keeping the nation safe, they are not ―neutral and disinterested‖ arbiters in deciding whether 
there is probable cause to search. Therefore, the court ruled that even in the context of 
national security investigations, ―the Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial 
judgment‖ before government investigators may use ―constitutionally sensitive means in 
pursuing their tasks.‖272  
 
More recent rulings by the Supreme Court concern the Executive authority of the Bush 
administration in the war on terrorism. In the following rulings, the approach of the Supreme 
Court substantially with reference to applying the doctrine of deference, a doctrine which led 
to the decisions in Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu. 
 
For example, in Rasul v. Bush,
273
 the Court held that Federal Courts have habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to review the legality of the detention of Guantanamo detainees and their 
classification as ‗enemy combatants‘.274 The Court went even further in Hamdi v 
Rumsfeld.
275
 The Court rejected the government‘s argument that because Hamdi was an 
‗enemy combatant‘, he could be indefinitely detained without access to counsel, and without 
any formal charge or proceeding. Thus, the court ruled Hamdi had not received due processes 
of law.  
 
Delivering the  majority opinion, Justice O‘Connor explained that it ―is during our most 
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation‘s commitment to due process is most 
severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the 
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principles for which we fight abroad.‖276 In rejecting the government‘s contention that the 
Court should play ―a heavily circumscribed role‖ in reviewing the actions of the Executive in 
wartime, O‘Connor pointedly observed that ―a state of war is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation‘s citizens.‖277  
 
Moreover, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
278
 Hamdan was deemed eligible for trial by military 
commission. As in New York Times Co, United States v. U.S. District Court, Rasul 
and Hamdi, the Court declined to grant broad deference to the Executive, instead making its 
own independent determination of the legality of the President‘s action. The Court held that 
Congress had not authorised the use of military commissions, and it further ruled that the 
Executive Order which established military commissions violated both the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
279
 As the US is a signatory to 
international law such as the Geneva Conventions, it is important that they adhere to their 
international obligations. This is particularly the case because the US is considered as the 
leading nation in the ‗War on Terror‘ and therefore their actions are scrutinised on a global 
level. The Court emphatically rejected the President‘s assertion that, as Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy, he could constitutionally impose these procedures even though they 
violated both federal and international law.
280
  
 
These twenty first century cases illustrate that the US courts do not wish to make mistakes 
like those made in the past by using the ―logical‖ presumption of deference, as evidenced in 
Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Instead the courts have adopted an approach which is a 
―pragmatic‖ presumption of close judicial scrutiny, as evidenced in Rasul, Hamdi, and 
Hamdan.
281
   
 
It is clear from these cases that the courts are no longer protecting national security concerns 
by automatically overriding civil liberties without strong evidence and rationale. The courts 
have recognised that there must be a constitutional balance and whilst cases like Hamidi, 
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Rasul and Hamdan have rejected the Executives‘ arguments and ruled in favour of the 
petitioners, many questions have been left unanswered. For example, in Hamdi and Rasul, the 
court failed to lay out the correct level of due process. Also, the rulings of the Supreme Court 
left unclear whether the court will impose any effective limits on government actions in 
response to the war on terror. However, by doing so, courts have retained a certain level of 
deference to the Executive during times of war and perceived dangers to the nation, albeit not 
complete deference as was previously the case. 
 
This is evident by the refusal of the Court to grant certiorariin a number of other cases that 
raised similar issues about the limits on government power after 9/11, including Center for 
National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice,
282
 North Jersey Media 
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft,
283
 and M.K.B. v. Warden.
284
 All the cases involved challenges to lower 
court decisions which deferred to government judgments about the need for secrecy in 
connection with post-9/11 detentions.  
 
Thus, the struggle to achieve a constitutional balance continues. However the cases illustrate 
that US courts are aiming to uphold the Rule of Law in relation to individual rights so far as 
is possible, whilst also affording a certain level of deference to the Executive on issues of 
national security.  The analysis shows that traditionally, courts were reluctant to rule on cases 
concerning national security issues. However, there has been a slow but noticeable assertion 
of authority by the courts since the 1970s to uphold the Rule of Law and declare Executive 
action incompatible with the US Constitution. 
 
This has not been received favourably by the Executive, who insist that matters of national 
security are not the concern of the courts and judicial determinations can potentially have 
detrimental effects for the nation. Nevertheless, it is important to note that although the courts 
have not retained a total level of deference to the Executive, it has recognised that the 
Executive are best positioned to decide on many matters. For example, in Hamdi, the courts 
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ruled that Hamdi must be afforded the correct level of due process but they failed in 
instructing the lower courts as to what the correct level of due process was.  
 
Nevertheless, cases like Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu have, in hindsight, raised 
awareness of the disastrous effects emergency powers may have. It is however important to 
note that above, the ‗War on Terror‘ began in 2001 and there appears to be little indication of 
the conflict ending. Therefore the judicial determinations in cases like Hamdi, Rasul and 
Hamdan illustrate that the courts have upheld their role as guardians of the law by allowing 
judicial review of Executive action, however only to the extent of ensuring Executive action 
does not unnecessarily or disproportionately affect individual rights. The courts have 
therefore retained a certain level of deference to ensure the Executive is not left powerless or 
weapon less in fighting the current war. 
 
3.2 United Kingdom  
 
In the United Kingdom the courts have also endured a continuous struggle in determining the 
balance between national security and civil liberties. Case law suggests that judges in the UK, 
just like those in the US, are very conscious of the boundary line between those matters in 
which they regards themselves as competent to adjudicate, and those matters which should be 
left for the democratically-elected government, i.e. the doctrine of deference.   
 
The doctrine may be compared with that of justiciability under judicial review. The principal 
distinction lies in the fact that whereas courts will rule on justiciability in order to decide 
whether to review, with deference the courts conduct an examination and then decide that 
they should defer to the elected government and / or Parliament on the grounds of 
competence and / or democratic principle. The concept is also similar to the concept of 
margin of appreciation, which is used by the Court of Human Rights and which confers on 
states an area of discretion with which the Court will not interfere.
285
   
 
Underlying the concept of deference is the desire to preserve the separation of powers 
between the judiciary, Executive and legislature, and to protect the judges from charges that 
they are interfering in another institution‘s legitimate sphere of power. In no area of policy is 
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this respect to separation of powers more clearly demonstrated than in matters of national 
security, which will frequently, but not inevitably, be linked to the exercise of the royal 
prerogative. 
 
The prerogative ensues for the Executive a wide and inadequately defined area of power 
which is largely immune from judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for Civil Service (the GCHQ case),
286
 the House of Lords ruled that the courts have 
jurisdiction to review the exercise of Executive power. Nevertheless, the House of Lords 
conceded that matters of national security fell within the class of powers deemed ‗non-
justiciable‘ by the courts, i.e. the subject matter is one more appropriately controlled by the 
Executive accountable to Parliament rather than the courts of law. Emphasising this, Lord 
Diplock explained that ―the judicial process is totally inept to deal with the sort of problems 
which it (national security) involves.‖287 
 
Notwithstanding the legitimacy of this objective, there is a fine line between deferring to 
another institution, and failing adequately to protect human rights – the legal duty288 which 
has been conferred on judges by the Human Rights Act.  Simon Brown L.J. commented in 
Roth
289
 that "the court's role under the Human Rights Act is to act as guardian of human 
rights. It cannot abdicate this responsibility."
290
  Therefore, suggestions that there must be 
―nearly absolute‖ deference in certain areas cannot be supported by the provisions of the Act 
itself. It is argued that a self-imposed abstinence by the courts from engaging in social policy 
and national security issues could undermine their ability to protect some fundamental rights 
altogether.
291
 
 
Typically, where the government has justified its actions on the basis of national security, the 
courts have been reluctant to challenge the Executive. This doctrine of deference can be 
illustrated by reference to a number of cases. For example, in Liversidge v Anderson (1942), 
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the House of Lords refused
292
 to review the Home Secretary‘s power of detention under the 
Defence of the Realm Acts. The regulation provided that the minister had power to order the 
detention of persons whom he ‗had reasonable cause to believe‘ to be of hostile origin or 
associations and ‗in need of subjection to preventative control‘.293  
 
In 1962, Dr Soblen, an American citizen who had been convicted of espionage in the United 
States, fled from the country before being sentenced. Whilst on an aeroplane, Dr Soben cut 
his wrists, and was landed in London for hospital treatment. The Home Secretary issued a 
deportation order on the basis that his continued presence was ‗not conducive to the public 
good‘. The Court of Appeal ruled that Dr Soblen had no right to make representation, and that 
deportation was an administrative matter for the Home Secretary.
294
  
 
In R v Home Secretary ex parte Hosenball,
295
 two American journalists, Philip Agee and 
Mark Hosenball, were detained with a view to deportation, on the basis that their work 
involved obtaining and publishing information prejudicial to national security. There was no 
appeal against the Home Secretary‘s decision where national security was pleaded.296 Instead, 
there was a right to a hearing before a panel of three advisors to the Home Secretary. When 
Hosenball tried to challenge the Home Secretary‘s decision in the courts, the Court of Appeal 
upheld the deportation order. It was recognised that the rules of natural justice applicable to 
immigration decisions had not been complied with in the decision to deport Hosenball. The 
Court of Appeal nevertheless ruled that the requirements of national security prevailed and 
that, where ―there is a conflict here between the interests of national security on the one hand 
and the freedom of the individual on the other‖, the Home Secretary ―is answerable to 
Parliament as to the way in which he did it and not to the courts here.‖297 
 
The case of R v Home Secretary ex parte Cheblak
298
 also reveals the extensive powers of the 
Home Secretary to detain persons ‗in the interests of national security‘. During the Gulf War, 
160 Iraqi and Palestinian citizens were detained with a view to deportation, on the basis that 
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their presence was not ‗conducive to the public good‘. Abbas Cheblak and his family had 
been resident in the United Kingdom for 16 years. In an application for habeas corpus, the 
Court of Appeal accepted the Home Secretary‘s explanation that Cheblak had associations 
with an unspecified organisation which supported the Iraqi government, and refused to press 
the Home Secretary for further information.
299
   
 
Furthermore, in R v Lambert
300
 Lord Woolf stated that the courts:  
 
―… should as a matter of constitutional principle pay a degree of deference to the 
view of Parliament as to what is in the interest of the public generally when upholding 
the rights of the individual under the Convention.‖301  
 
The incorporation of European Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 does not 
extend judicial protection to suspects beyond that already guaranteed by the ordinary criminal 
justice model in the UK. Although the Convention protects, inter alia, the right to liberty, fair 
trial and privacy, two factors limit their effectiveness in relation to national security matters. 
The first limitation is the permissible exceptions specified in the relevant articles. The second 
lies in this continuing concept of judicial deference, whereby the judges express the view that 
they should defer to the democratically elected government in matters of security.  In a clash 
between judges, dissenting judges in Hirst v. the United Kingdom stressed ―it is essential to 
bear in mind that the Court is not a legislator and should be careful not to assume legislative 
functions.‖302   
 
(i) Deference in modern times  
 
As discussed above, the historical tendency of the United Kingdom judiciary, as that of the 
United States, has also been to defer to the Executive whenever credible national security 
issues are raised by the government.
303
 The historical tendency of judges to defer to the 
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Executive in such areas appears greatly outdated in light of the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA).
304
 For instance, the inability to challenge indefinite detention without trial through 
judicial review would be considered as outrageous from a human rights 
perspective.
305
 Nevertheless, from a national security perspective, judicial deference to the 
Executive is reflective of traditional theories that the Executive is best positioned to make 
decisions regarding national security and, therefore, there should be minimal constitutional 
checks and balances by the judiciary.  
 
Judicial deference is particularly contentious in relation to Articles 5 and 6 of the HRA, 
which concern due process and fair trial, as such areas provide for minimal judicial restraint. 
For example, the Act expressly binds the Crown, and imposes an unqualified obligation on 
public authorities to comply with Convention rights under section 6(1).
306
 However, this 
provision excludes Parliament. Therefore, in the absence of derogation under Article 15, there 
can be no question of any agency of the Executive, for example the Special Immigration 
Appeal Commission (SIAC), relying upon Crown Immunity, when seeking to take action 
against foreign nationals considered a security risk. Additionally, the HRA removes from 
judges the discretion to refuse in principle to review the actions of any public authority on 
any grounds.   
 
Therefore, the UK courts have increasingly maintained their role as the self-appointed 
‗guardian of the constitution‘ in general, and ‗guardians of human rights‘ in particular.  This 
means that the criteria of proportionality of response and the prohibition of discrimination 
regarding foreign nationals remain relevant even where they concern issues of national 
security. Thus, automatic judicial deference is increasingly rejected. In light of human rights, 
which challenge the idea that national security decisions are not subject to judicial review, 
judges have changed their approach and such deference has become more qualified.  Courts 
do however, continue to recognise that the Executive possess special expertise in areas 
regarding national security.  
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In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman (AP),
307
 the House of Lords 
reviewed the Home Secretary‘s decision to deport a Pakistani national on the ground that it 
would be ‗conducive to the public good in the interests of national security because of 
association with Islamic terrorist groups.‘308  
 
Issued shortly after 9/11, on 11 October 2001, the unanimous decision upheld the decision of 
the Secretary of State to deport a Pakistani-born Imam because the Home Secretary 
maintained that he was involved in terrorist activities abroad. The Court held that the 
Executive is ―undoubtedly in the best position to judge what national security requires.‖309  
The decision essentially limits the role of the judiciary and affords government officials the 
ultimate power to decide what actions are necessary to combat terrorism. Lord Hoffman also 
recognised that in such circumstances, the role of the judiciary is limited and it is the 
Executive that rightly have ultimate political and constitutional responsibility for national 
security  
 
―It is not only that the Executive has access to special information and expertise 
in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results for 
the community, require a legitimacy that can be conferred only by entrusting 
them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic 
process.‖310  
 
This case reflects the court‘s traditional role to defer questions of national security and 
instead, allow responsibility to lie with the Executive. However, more recently, the judiciary 
appear to reiterate their role as guardians of the law and, thus, have reduced the level of 
deference typically given to the Executive.   
 
Similar to the United States detainment of alien enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, the 
United Kingdom detained foreign nationals without counsel or hearing at Belmarsh prison, 
under the control of the British government.
311
 Like the US, the UK made legislation a 
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central facet of its response to the attacks of 9/11, which led to subsequent challenges in 
British courts.  
 
For example, in A. v. Secretary of State for the Department,
312
 the House of Lords considered 
Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
313
 which provided for the indefinite 
detention of non-citizens deemed by the Executive to represent a threat to national security.  
In order to achieve this, the government derogated
314
 from Article 5 of the European 
Convention, which provides, ―everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.‖ The 
Order acknowledged the existence and effect of the Immigration Act and the European 
Convention and articulated the necessity of derogating from those existing legal principles 
due to the ‗exigencies of the situation‘, i.e. the threat terrorism posed to national 
security.
315
 The government justified derogation on the basis that there was a ―public 
emergency‖.316   
 
This determination follows the rationale for judicial deference in Rehman. The majority of 
the House of Lords retained a traditional deference to the Executive on the question of 
whether there was, in fact, an emergency.  In a reversal of his earlier stance, Lord Hoffmann 
dissented on the basis that no other country in Europe had declared an emergency, and that 
the dangers of overreacting to acts of terrorism are greater than terrorism itself.
317
  
 
The detainees also argued that the derogative elements in Part IV of the ATCSA violated the 
principle of proportionality. According to the proportionality principle, any limitation of a 
fundamental right, in this instance the right to liberty, based on a claim of public emergency 
must be strictly limited in proportion to the threat.   
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In 1961, the European Court of Human Rights upheld detention of an IRA activist 
in Ireland.
318
  In contrast, over four decades later, the House of Lords interpreted the ECHR 
and the jurisprudence of the ECHR, to rule that UK law permitting detention enacted by 
derogation from Article 5, failed to meet the tests of proportionality and non-discrimination 
required of derogations, and was thus incompatible with the ECHR.
319
  
 
The House of Lords considered this scheme in light of the derogation provisions of the 
ECHR, which they considered to be to the same effect as those of the ICCPR with regard to 
discrimination.
320
 Lord Bingham therefore concluded that although:  
 
―Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, in requiring that a measure introduced in derogation from 
Covenant obligations must not discriminate, does not include nationality, national 
origin or "other status" among the forbidden grounds of discrimination: …, by article 
2 of the ICCPR the states parties undertake to respect and ensure to all individuals 
within the territory the rights in the Covenant "without distinction of any kind, such as 
race ….., national or social origin ….. or other status". Similarly, article 26 
guarantees equal protection against discrimination "on any ground such as race, ….. 
national or social origin ….. or other status". This language is broad enough to 
embrace nationality and immigration status. It is open to states to derogate from 
articles 2 and 26 but the United Kingdom has not done so. If, therefore, as I have 
concluded, section 23 discriminates against the appellants on grounds of their 
nationality or immigration status, there is a breach of articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR 
and so a breach of the UK's "other obligations under international law" within the 
meaning of article 15 of the European Convention.‖321  
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Even though the new scheme had even more procedural safeguards than those in place 
in Lawless,
322
  the Law Lords adjudged that the legislation was both disproportionate and 
discriminatory, and hence incompatible with the ECHR.
323
   
 
The core of the problem was discrimination: foreign citizens suspected of international 
terrorism could be detained indefinitely, whereas British citizens could not. If that were the 
only problem, the Court might simply have advised the government that it needed to provide 
equal treatment. But the Court went further, suggesting that restrictions on liberty short of 
detention should suffice and effectively inhibit terrorist activity.
324
  
 
Interestingly, Lord Bingham emphasised that the decision was driven by the constitutional 
necessity of maintaining the courts‘ role in enforcing principled legal constraints on 
government action. ―The function of independent judges charged to interpret and apply the 
law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature of the modern democratic state, a 
cornerstone of the Rule of Law itself. The Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the 
proper limits of judicial authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as 
in some way undemocratic.‖325  
 
Lord Bingham‘s justification rejects claims, such as Schmitt‘s, which state that Parliament is 
sovereign and thus, the judiciary is subordinate to Parliament. Some suggest that the courts 
must always defer to the Executive on matters concerning national security. However, this 
leaves unquestioned government actions and allows for the Executive to act in a way which is 
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unlimited and ill defined. Further clarifying the rationale for the decision, Lord Bingham 
added, ―the 1998 [Human Rights] Act gives the courts a very specific, wholly democratic, 
mandate. As Professor Jowell has put it: ―The courts are charged by Parliament with 
delineating the boundaries of a rights-based democracy.‖326   
 
As the US government had contended in similar cases, the British government also argued 
that the courts should defer to the Executive and the legislature regarding the nature of the 
threats posed by terrorism and the necessity of the actions taken in response.
327
 Reaffirming 
the view of Lord Bingham, Lord Hope emphasised the principle of proportionality and 
stressed that as the case concerned actions which affect the rights and freedoms of the 
individual, the courts ―may legitimately intervene, to ensure that the actions taken are 
proportionate.‖328 The notion of proportionality states that any layer of government should 
not take ‗any action that exceeds that which is necessary to achieve the objective of 
government ‗.  
 
The context here is set by the nature of the right to liberty which the Convention guarantees 
to everyone, and by the responsibility of the court to give effect to the guarantee to minimise 
the risk of arbitrariness and to ensure the Rule of Law. Its absolute nature, save only in the 
circumstances that are expressly provided for in Article 5(1), indicates that any interference 
with the right to liberty must be accorded the fullest and most anxious scrutiny. The 
Executive did not extend Part IV past its specified date of repeal and instead, responded by 
introducing new legislation that allowed control orders to be imposed on all suspected 
terrorists, irrespective of nationality.
329
   
 
Therefore, the question of whether indefinite security by way of derogation would receive 
judicial approval in the European Courts today, as in Lawless, is unclear. In Brannigan and 
McBride v. UK,
330
 the Court upheld British detentions under derogation of terrorists in 
Northern Ireland for periods of up to seven days without judicial supervision. However, the 
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Court emphasised adherence to safeguards, particularly access to habeas corpus, the absolute 
and legally enforceable right of access to a solicitor within 48 hours, the right to inform a 
friend or relative of his detention, and the right to have access to a doctor.
331
   
 
However, the implications of Brannigan, i.e. detailed scrutiny of whether derogations from 
Article 5 are ―strictly required‖ by the exigencies, are illustrated in Aksoy v. 
Turkey.
332
 In Aksoy, Turkey had derogated from ECHR Article 5 in order to detain terrorism 
suspects. The Court found that a detention of fourteen days without judicial supervision was 
―exceptionally long, and left the applicant vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with 
his right to liberty but also to torture.‖ Moreover, the Government failed to adduce any 
―detailed reasons as to why the fight against terrorism . . . rendered judicial intervention 
impracticable.‖333   
 
Hence, although the Court in Lawless had upheld a security detention under derogation of 
five months, in Aksoy it was unwilling to uphold a detention under derogation of fourteen 
days without judicial supervision.
334
 Furthermore, the Belmarsh detainees took their case to 
the European Court of Human Rights.  
 
The Grand Chamber held that their detention violated Article 5 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR).  This was on the grounds that they were not detained with a view 
to deportation given the fact that they would face a substantial risk of torture if returned to 
their countries of citizenship. The Court confirmed the decision of the House of Lords on 
both points discussed above. However, it was also held that some of the detainees were 
denied a fair hearing to test the legality of their detention.  This was because they were denied 
knowledge of the specific allegations against them and thus could not work effectively with a 
security cleared special advocate in preparing their defence.   
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These cases indicate continuing problems regarding the use of such advocates to mediate 
between ―fair trial‖ considerations under Article 6 of the HRA and national security 
imperatives.  
 
3.3 Conflicts between national security and civil liberties  
 
The question regarding the standard by which a judge should review Executive or legislative 
actions taken in wartime has several possible answers therefore.   
 
Firstly, the Court may act as a guardian of the law, as the judiciary is considered to ―guard the 
constitution and the rights of individuals.‖335 Therefore, the court may depart from the 
preferences of the Executive and military officials, as in Milligan.  This approach requires 
courts to conduct an independent non deferential review of Executive action, regardless of 
whether that review decreases the nation‘s ability to successfully defend itself against its 
enemies. However, such an approach has been rejected on the basis that although ―the 
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.‖336  
 
Alternatively, the Courts response may mirror that of the nation‘s leader and thus the 
Executive, by deferring completely to the political branches, as seen in Korematsu. Having 
overlooked questions of race discrimination and racial profiling, as well as the absence of any 
specific suspicion that Korematsu was disloyal, Justice Hugo Black explained that the court:  
 
―cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have 
ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national 
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken 
to guard against it.‖337   
 
Additionally, recognising the lack of evidence, Justice Robert Jackson, dissenting, elaborated 
further.  
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―In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent 
judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on 
information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that could not 
be proved. . . . Hence courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the 
mere declaration of the authorities that issued the order that it was reasonably 
necessary from a military viewpoint.‖338  
 
The problem with this deferential approach is that decisions based on such deference create 
precedents that are potentially unacceptable once the threat of war has receded, as illustrated 
below.  The third approach, which is traditionally adopted by courts, is to apply a diminished 
standard of review to the constitutionality of wartime policies and actions.   
 
The first approach protects, rather than curtails individual rights, in times of emergency. Such 
an approach, of the judiciary as guardian, and not a suppressor, of rights in times of war, has 
been accepted by many legal scholars and jurists, including Geoffrey R. Stone,
339
 George 
Fletcher,
340
 and Justice Abe Fortas.
341
 However, many commentators agree that ―through 
much of U.S. history, in times of war and tension, the courts have bent to claims of 
presidential power.‖ The Courts have traditionally endorsed Executive action to suppress 
rights and thus, they do not ―guard‖ the Constitution.342   
 
On many occasions, therefore, the courts have typically agreed with government actions on 
the basis that the Executive is best positioned to decide whether an emergency exists and if 
so, what is necessary by way of counter measures to protect the national security of the 
nation. Thus, given the situation, judges will often defer to the Executive‘s judgment about 
what is required, i.e. the doctrine of judicial deference. Judicial deference occurs when judges 
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assign varying degrees of weight to the judgments of the elected branches, out of respect for 
their superior expertise, competence or democratic legitimacy.
343
   
 
The traditional judicial willingness to defer to the government on national security matters 
also derives from the assumption that cases involving national security matters are the 
exception and not the norm. Thus, in matters where the government interest in infringing 
individual rights is particularly urgent, the courts believe it is legitimate to defer to the 
government.   
 
The idea of deviating from internationally recognised legislation during times of emergency, 
e.g. during the Second World War, was also considered in Liversidge.
344
 The question before 
the House of Lords was a matter of the interpretation of Defence Regulation 18B which 
provided that the Home Secretary may order a person to be detained ‗if he has reasonable 
cause to believe‘ the person to be of hostile origin or associations. A majority of four held that 
if the Home Secretary thinks he has good cause that is good enough.  
 
However, Lord Atkin rejected the majority view and argued that the statute required the 
Home Secretary to have reasonable grounds for detention. He reiterated that: ‗amid the clash 
of arms the laws are not silent,‖ and warned against judges who ―when face to face with 
claims involving the liberty of the subject show themselves more Executive minded  than the 
Executive.‖345   
 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords in Liversidge, effectively held that the detention of persons 
in wartime under reg.18B of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 could only be 
successfully challenged if the Home Secretary could be shown not to have acted in good 
faith. This approach meant that the balancing of the interests of national security against 
those of the individual was the sole prerogative of the Home Secretary.  
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Despite his lone dissent, the judgment by Lord Atkin is significant. It emphasised the idea of 
the deep rooted principle of the judiciary as guardians of the Rule of Law and thus, rejects 
Schmitt‘s claims regarding exclusive sovereignty without adversarial scrutiny. Similarly, 
Dyzenhaus provides a critique of arguments of those who, like Schmitt, defend extra-
constitutional powers. He argues that claims for suspension of the normal Rule of Law leads 
to the creation of constitutional ―black holes‖ into which rights and legality 
fall.
346
 Furthermore, the case is important as despite the difference on a mere point of 
statutory interpretation, it is illustrative of the recurring clash of fundamentally different 
views about the role of courts in times of crisis.
 347
 
 
The level to which contemporary decisions reflect the philosophy of Lord Atkin is far from 
clear. The national security approach maintains courts must always defer to the Executive and 
this is logical because the Executive are the elected representatives of the nation. An 
alternative view, however, is that although courts must take into consideration the relative 
constitutional competence of branches of government to decide particular issues, they must 
never, on constitutional grounds, surrender the constitutional duties placed on them.
348
  
 
Executive action was therefore left unquestioned by the Courts during wartime. In dealing 
with conflicts between national security and civil liberties, the Courts have traditionally 
adopted the principle of judicial deference , and therefore presumed that restriction of civil 
liberties in wartime were constitutionally justified because the Executive was acting to 
protect the national security of the nation.  
 
3.4 National security arguments  
 
From a national security perspective, the Courts lack authority to address questions regarding 
legitimacy of detaining individuals indefinitely. This viewpoint suggests the President, as the 
Commander in Chief, is best placed to decide on the necessary actions during times of war 
and therefore, such issues are not to questioned by the Courts as times of war require quick 
and effective decisions to be made. Therefore, the ‗national security perspective‘ upholds the 
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right to curtail individual rights in times of emergencies. The model is baised upon the claim 
that the Rule of Law may have little or no application in an exceptional situation.   
 
Thus, supporters of this model, including Schmitt, insist that judicial deference is completely 
justified because the decision of when and what amounts to an emergency undoubtedly lies 
with the Executive.
349
 Therefore, the Executive is considered to be beyond the realms of the 
law during times of emergency and conflict. Indeed, Carl Schmitt argued that such 
emergencies permit suspension of the normal Rule of Law and a venturing into extra-
constitutional power.  Schmitt claims, ―Sovereign is he who decides on the state of 
exception.‖350 He thus asserted that in abnormal times the sovereign is legally uncontrolled.  
 
Furthermore, academics such as Zechariah Chafee Jr,
351
 Thomas I. Emerson,
352
 and Sanford 
Levinson,
353
 maintain that threats to national security require the judiciary to adopt a 
jurisprudential stance that leads it to restrict rights and liberties it otherwise would not. Such 
academics would argue that when conflicts arise between national security and civil liberties 
during times of war, judges should begin by affording much deference to the Executive. 
Several reasons for this have been identified.   
 
First, such cases rarely arise and so individual judges have relatively little first-hand 
experience with national security matters. Therefore judges are ―relative novices‖ when it 
comes to assessing the possible implications of their decisions for national security.  Second, 
the risks of ineffective responses may be substantial.  The potential consequences of a judge‘s 
misjudged decision regarding national security may lead to devastating effects across the 
nation.  Lastly, Stone argues deference is favourable for ―institutional reasons‖. He argues 
that military and Executive officials are best placed to make decisions in such conflicts and 
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therefore ―judges should be reluctant to second-guess these judgments.‖354  Thus, he argues 
judicial interference should be kept to a minimal and issues arising in times of conflict should 
be deferred to the Executive. 
 
3.5 Civil liberties arguments  
 
On the other hand, from a ‗civil liberties perspective‘, the decisions of the government are 
always subject to judicial review, and as the Constitution requires Courts to uphold the Rule 
of Law, it is undoubtedly the responsibility of the Courts to ensure that government decisions, 
even in times of war, are subject to judicial review. Civil libertarians argue individual rights 
must always be protected and they must not be curtailed even during times of state 
emergencies. Furthermore, national security arguments are not justifiable to infringe civil 
liberties. Therefore judges must fulfil their constitutional duty to uphold the Rule of Law.   
 
Dyzenhaus for example responds to Schmitt‘s challenge and argues that legislatures can enact 
and courts enforce policies to protect national security in times of emergency without 
threatening the law's inner morality. Whilst recognising that ―Political reality seems to 
triumph again and again over any effort to impose the Rule of Law in exceptional 
circumstances,‖355 Dyzenhaus still contends that extraordinary times do not require 
extraordinary governmental powers that enhance legislative or Executive authority at the 
expense of Rule of Law, rights and judicial review. He asserts therefore, that it is entirely 
possible to respond to emergencies while respecting Rule of Law, and judges have a duty to 
preserve the law and therefore ensure the government do not act beyond the realms of the 
law.
356
   
 
Moreover, Professor Allan, writing from a liberal perspective, describes the doctrine of 
judicial deference as ―pernicious‖,357 arguing that it permits ―the abdication of judicial 
responsibility in favour of reliance on the good faith or good sense or special expertise of 
public officials, whose judgments about the implications of rights in specific cases may well 
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be wrong.‖358 He further argues, the end result is ―the conferral on either Parliament or the 
Executive of a wholly unfettered power to strip…individual right[s]…of any practical 
effect‖.359   Professor Allan‘s concerns of the end result reflect a Schmittian view that the 
President, as Commander in Chief, should be totally empowered to decide whether an 
emergency exists and if so, what measures should be taken to deal with such an emergency.  
It places the actions of the President and the Executive, as a whole, above the level of judicial 
oversight and democratic accountability. 
 
3.6 Judicial deference  
 
It is, therefore, clear that the principle of judicial deference ―assumes that those making the 
critical judgments are properly taking the relevant factors into account in a fair and 
reasonable manner. If they fail to do so, the underlying rationale for deference is 
destroyed.‖360 Stone identifies three reasons why this essential requirement, that would make 
judicial deference successful, is, or could be, lacking. Firstly, government officials tend to 
exaggerate dangers faced by the nation, ―both to protect themselves in the event they fail and 
to persuade legislators and the public to grant them as much power as possible.‖ Second, 
Stone also argues that government officials are quick to sacrifice civil liberties in order to 
achieve their primary goal of safeguarding national security.  Finally, ―opportunistic 
politicians tend to exploit periods of real or perceived crisis for partisan and personal 
gain.‖361  
 
Such reasons explain why judicial deference to the Executive can sometimes lead to 
controversial decisions like Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu. By deferring to the 
Executive, whose judgments may be distorted by such influences, officials are allowing 
national security concerns to prevail over civil liberties. This means that although judges 
should be cautious when questioning the actions of the Executive, judicial review requires a 
rigorous approach to ensure decisions such as Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu are 
avoided. Such decisions, which failed to question the legitimacy of Executive power, allowed 
the Executive to act without judicial or administrative oversight. By failing to uphold the 
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Rule of Law, the judiciary has allowed Executive action to remain unquestioned and allowed 
specific communities to be targeted based on mere suspicion and not fact. 
 
However, it is important to note that the judiciary‘s role in enforcing individual civil liberties 
is similar. Judges in common law systems have typically been considered as ―protectors of 
freedom‖362 and those involved in preserving civil liberties are more likely to protect 
individual rights and freedom over restrictive government actions. However, the challenge 
faced by judges goes far beyond protecting civil liberties.  
 
Judges must ensure they protect civil liberties without unduly preventing or restricting the 
government from protecting national security. The failure of the courts to protect national 
security concerns can ultimately lead to violation of individual rights also. For example, 
undetected threats posed by terrorism caused by legal constraints may lead to terror attacks, 
and therefore cause loss of life and property. Therefore, amidst turmoil of conflicting 
concerns, judges are likely to turn to deference as ――judges, like other citizens, do not wish to 
hinder a nation‘s ‗war effort‘.‖363  Judges do not want to be responsible for losing a war or 
for a mass tragedy. This is evident by the decision of the US District Court in Hamdi in which 
it was held that ―political branches are best positioned to comprehend this global war in its 
full context,‖364 Therefore a certain level deference is considered preferable. Establishing the 
correct level of deference can poses great difficulties however.  
 
It is clear that wartime has traditionally indicated repeated restriction of civil liberties because 
of the courts‘ failure to question the judgment and actions of the Executive on matters 
concerning national security. However, the above decisions indicate that a logical 
presumption of deference to the Executive can be dangerous. Therefore, ―courts must closely 
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scrutinize invocations of military necessity and national security as justifications for limiting 
civil liberties.‖365  
 
3.7 Summary 
 
The above discussion demonstrates the changing role of the judiciary when ruling on 
conflicts between national security and civil liberties. Both the US and the UK have 
traditionally upheld the power of the Executive to determine threats to national security, 
through the doctrine of judicial deference. However, in more recent times, the Courts have 
upheld the right for greater judicial oversight into such areas and thus, rejected the idea of 
automatic overriding of civil liberties by national security.   
 
Nevertheless, judicial oversight of the Executive has differed markedly between the two 
countries. In the United Kingdom, the Courts, fortified by the 1998 Human Rights Act, have 
challenged the Government on the detention without charge of foreign terror suspects and the 
subsequent use of control orders.
366
 In doing so, the Courts have shown that the Government 
has acted in ways that are incompatible with provisions found in the European Convention on 
Human Rights and have in many ways asserted a new level of judicial control over the 
Executive.   
 
Lord Bingham‘s explicit reference to the function of independent judges in interpreting and 
applying the law as a cornerstone of the Rule of Law links the House‘s decision in Belmarsh 
I with the opinions of the US judges, for example Justice Breyer and Judge Rogers 
in Boumediene. The common theme amongst the judges is the constitutional responsibility of 
the courts to ensure that the Rule of Law is consistently maintained, particularly during the 
course of government responses to the threats of terrorism.   
 
In contrast, the Supreme Court in the United States, have wavered in their approach to 
Executive action, and its decisions have focused primarily on the detention of terror suspects 
at Guantánamo Bay. The Hamdi decision ruled that detainees who were U.S. citizens had the 
right to habeas corpus even if they were classified as ―enemy combatants.‖ In Hamdan, the 
                                                 
365
 Stone, G. R. (2006) ‗Civil Liberties v. National Security in the Law‘s Open Areas‘ 86 Boston University Law 
Review 1315, page 16. 
366
 A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
96 
 
Court found that the proposed military commissions for trying terror suspects violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions.  
 
In the United States, there are mixed reviews for the activities of the Supreme Court, which 
has focused its attention primarily on the detention of terror suspects at Guantánamo Bay. 
The Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision in 2004 ruled that detainees who were U.S. citizens had the 
right to habeas corpus even if they were classified as ‗enemy combatants‘.367 The Hamdan 
decision found that the proposed military commissions for trying terror suspects violated the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the four Geneva Conventions.
368
 
 
Although initially, it may appear that Hamdi was a triumph for international law and human 
rights, the decision was somewhat more complex. Hamdi had been detained for over three 
years before the Supreme Court considered his case, as previous decisions by lower courts 
insisted that the President had the authority to detain him. Next, only Justice Stevens and 
Justice Scalia, believed that the US Constitution guaranteed Hamdi a trial by jury.
369
 Justice 
Thomas emphatically rejected this argument, insisting that the President had the power to 
―unilaterally decide to detain an individual if the Executive deems this necessary for the 
public safety even if he [was] mistaken.‖370  
 
This opinion by  has been received by some as shocking as it affords the President unilateral 
power to deal with a threat to the nation, an argument also supported by Schmitt. This is 
evident of the argument that the democratically elected leader of a country is in the best 
position to make decisions on when an emergency exists and the necessary measures to deal 
with it.   
 
However, Ackerman argues that the opinion appears to ―vindicate the president‘s authority 
unilaterally to declare an emergency in response to any perceived threat [imminent or 
otherwise] . . .‖ and to detain indefinitely without charge any US citizen, even if the President 
is mistaken.
371
 It is important to note, however, that Justice Thomas‘s view is in the minority, 
as Justice O‘Connor agreed with the majority opinion that habeas corpus does apply to 
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Hamdi. However, the difference in opinions indicates the continued precariousness of the Bill 
of Rights in the United States.  
 
A striking difference between the approach of the courts in the US and the UK is, therefore, 
demonstrated by UK courts‘ obligation to comply with the HRA 1991. Although the HRA 
governs the UK government in many ways, the US is not limited in such a manner.   
 
However, what is clear is that because the ‗war on terror‘ is a term deployed by the US, it has 
led to many actions not previously seen in times of crisis. Thus, judicial deference to the level 
afforded previously becomes difficult. For example, complete judicial deference with respect 
to the war on terror would inevitably mean that the nations‘ actions domestically, and 
internationally, would be left unlimited and unchallenged. On the other hand, total judicial 
oversight of Executive actions may mean that the Executive is unable to adequately react to 
immediate threats posed to the nation and responsibility for this would lie with the judiciary.  
 
A certain level of judicial review into the actions of the Executive appears necessary, 
therefore to ensure the judiciary is fulfilling its role of upholding the Rule of Law, 
particularly in times of wars and emergencies. Decisions regarding national security 
imperatives, such as whether an emergency exists and what actions are necessary, are 
generally considered to be that of the Commander in Chief, However, in more recent times, 
the courts have reiterated that they are within their jurisdiction to ensure any actions taken are 
proportionate and therefore do not unnecessarily infringe individual rights.  
 
However, many feel it is not for judges to decide on such matters as they are unaware of the 
consequences. This is an opinion which is clearly demonstrated by referring to a statement by 
Charles Clarke, the former Home Secretary. When giving evidence to a Parliamentary 
Committee, he protested that, "The judiciary bears not the slightest responsibility for 
protecting the public and sometimes seems utterly unaware of the implications of their 
decisions for our society".
372
 
 
Requiring courts to abstain from ruling on such matters can cause difficulties, however, as 
recognised in the ruling of Boumediene.  The judges made it clear that ―Abstaining from 
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questions involving formal sovereignty and territorial governance is one thing. To hold the 
political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will is quite another. 
The former position reflects this Court's recognition that certain matters requiring political 
judgments are best left to the political branches. The latter would permit a striking anomaly 
in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the 
President, not this Court, say 'what the law is.'" 
 
The cases relating to recent terrorist threats illustrate the courts approach in affording a 
certain level of deference to the Executive during times of war and perceived dangers to the 
nation, albeit not complete deference as was previously the case. This is indicative of a shift 
of balance from almost uncritical deference to deference only if shown to be necessary and 
proportionate. This has, to some extent, shifted the onus of proof to the government to ensure 
the action they are taking is necessary and required by the exigencies of the situation.  
 
However, as demonstrated throughout this section, achieving a constitutional balance 
between national security and civil liberties can be extremely difficult and challenging for the 
courts. Although the role of the judiciary is to uphold the Rule of Law, the Executive may, in 
times of crisis and emergency, require the judiciary to leave the actions of the Executive 
unquestioned. Issues regarding national security raise questions regarding the level of judicial 
review necessary, if at all any. 
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Conclusion 
 
This analysis of the response to terrorism in the US and the UK shows that the governments 
in both countries have resorted to exceptional powers used primarily in times of war. Having 
compared the approaches of the two countries, it is now possible to identify what each nation 
can learn from the other in striking a legitimate constitutional balance between national 
security and human rights. 
 
Firstly, the classification by the US of this struggle as the ‗war on terror‘ has most 
significantly authorised the President to exercise total authority as Commander in Chief to 
combat the threat of terrorism, with little Congressional or judicial oversight and/or 
authorisation. However, using the term ‗war‘ involves a potential risk of treating these 
individuals as soldiers and not criminals. This is counterproductive and can inevitably lead to 
legitimising the cause of the terrorists and increasing sympathy 
 
Nevertheless, the US government has used the AUMF to detain suspected terrorists 
incommunicado, with no indication of how long such detention may last. This is indicated by 
the military base at Guantanamo Bay. Although President Obama vowed to close this down, 
there are still a number of detainees detained at the military base. Similarly, the UK enacted 
ATCSA, which attempted to indefinitely detain non-British nationals suspected of terrorism 
was declared incompatible with Article 14 of the ECHR.
373
 Although the provision is not in 
use, it raised questions about individual rights under Article 5, which is also the case in 
relation to control orders established under the PTA 2005.  
 
Additionally, the pre-charge detention provision which allowed for 28 days has not been 
renewed and therefore pre-charge detention reverts back to 14 days under CJA 2003. This 
demonstrates that in comparison to the US, the UK has tried to strike a balance between the 
necessities of extended detention with the necessity and proportionality of such measures. 
However, it is important to note that UK‘s decision to extend pre-charge detention to 28 days 
was longer than that of any other European country.  
 
Furthermore, there are numerous models which can be adopted to fight terrorism, 
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predominantly the criminal Justice Model and the War Model.
374
 The United Kingdom has in 
large, adopted the Criminal Justice Model by using its ordinary courts and rules of war to try 
suspected terrorists. This is despite repeated calls for a ―security model that is not based on 
fear and suspicion.‖375 The United States, in comparison, has responded to the terrorist 
threats by using the war model which is based on such fear and suspicion.  
 
This model ultimately relies on the argument that the extraordinary nature of the 
unconventional threat of terrorism requires the use of extraordinary measures which justify 
the reduction of individual rights. This is clearly demonstrated by the decision of the US to 
use military commissions thus preventing the right to petition for an Article III Court review. 
In contrast, the UK has retained its approach in using the ordinary courts to try suspected 
terrorists. 
 
It is clear that the UK has, arguably, achieved an adequate balance between protecting 
national security and also ensuring human rights are not unnecessarily violated. In 
comparison to the US, the UK appears to have been more successful in achieving a viable 
balance. Therefore, the US can learn some lessons from the UK in order to establish a 
criminal justice system that is more consistent with human rights. Firstly, the US could 
amend legislation relating to detention to ensure greater compliance with human rights. It 
could also replace its war-like model with that of a largely criminal justice model, using 
ordinary courts to try suspects, whilst also allowing for exceptional measures if necessary. 
Adopting such an approach would increase the legitimacy of the actions of the US globally 
also and thus, would have greater credibility.  
 
The UK can also benefit from the analysis of the US experience. For example, in relation to 
domestic terrorists, US measures in relation to detention have shown that US citizens cannot 
be detained indefinitely without due process rights.
376
 Also, if the terrorist threat in the UK 
culminated in an attack of a similar scale to 9/11, exceptional measures may be required as 
those during the IRA era. Therefore, US legislation such as the DTA and MCA may become 
relevant and the UK can use such legislation as the foundation for counter-terrorist measures 
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if the criminal justice system is no longer considered adequate.  
 
Additionally, the thesis suggests that whilst legislation has been enacted hastily in response to 
an urgent situation, there appears to have been little questioning of the principles 
underpinning this situation. For example, why has the fundamental matter of charging 
terrorists with specific offences not been addressed? It is clear that there are problems 
because the secretive and covert nature of terrorists means allegations of involvement in 
terrorism are difficult to investigate. However, the decision to subject individuals to 
indeterminate restraints of liberty, contravenes levels of due process and the basic rights set 
out in a multitude of International Charters on Human Rights.  
 
Therefore, the central question is how developments in both countries address the debate 
regarding the best ways in which to fight terrorism while not undermining a commitment to 
fundamental European and international human rights? An appropriate response to try and 
prevent further terrorist attacks would ensure the basic values of democratic countries are not 
undermined. The foundation of this approach is that the European law on human rights 
already has criteria established for the conditions under which certain rights may be 
curtailed.
377
  
 
Such an approach does not disregard security, nor does it claim that all rights must be 
protected at all times. Instead, it seeks to establish a legal standard that recognises the need to 
protect human rights whilst also protecting security. This approach reflects the criminal 
justice model, which has, in large, been adopted by the UK. As the criminal justice model is 
consistent with the human rights approach by affording suspected terrorists a fair judicial 
process, it means that: 
 
―Open and public trials allow the community to see the terrorist for the criminal he [or 
she] is, and successful prosecutions give them faith the government is protecting them. 
Judicial review ensures that the methods used are in accordance with the law, and juries 
enforce community standards of fairness. The adversarial process exposes improper or 
ineffective law enforcement techniques so they can be corrected. Checks and balances on 
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government power and public accountability promote efficiency by ensuring that only the 
guilty are punished.‖378 
 
Therefore as democratic societies have ensured judicial oversight of Executive action, chapter 
3 considered the approach of the judiciary in achieving a viable constitutional balance.  The 
cases prior to 9/11 indicate the conflict in both countries between the desire of the Executive 
to enact and implement certain pre-emption measures on the one hand, against, the wish of 
the judiciary to adhere to overriding legal principles on the other – in the UK, the European 
Convention of Human Rights and in the US, the US Constitution. Typically, concerns over 
national security have led to systematic violations of human rights, as seen in the US cases of 
Schenck, Hirabayashi and Korematsu. 
  
There has been a move away from such critical deference after the attacks of 9/11; however a 
certain level of deference to the Executive has been retained, particularly in the US. 
Nevertheless, the cases illustrate that although courts have criticised unwarranted 
infringement of rights, they have also provided sufficient leeway to the Executive to respond 
effectively to terrorism. This level of judicial oversight encourages the Executive to enact 
counter-terrorist measures which, as far as possible, are compatible with human rights.  
 
Thus, it is always necessary to conduct a balancing act between the rights of citizens to live in 
peace and security of persons and property, against the rights of individuals who may seek to 
threaten this. The criminal justice systems in both the US and the UK are founded on a 
presumption of innocence and the Executive must consider ways in which this can be 
preserved through the use of expedited investigations and individuals charged or released. 
Such an approach is consistent with a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in which it 
was emphasised that ―The overreaching principle of fundamental justice that applies here is 
this: before the state can detain people for significant periods of time, it must accord them a 
fair judicial process.‖379 
 
Nevertheless, the thesis also recognises that a nation that considers some civil liberties of 
greater importance than its security will eventually fail, as it will be without a means of 
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protecting itself from those who seek to destroy it. Constitutions are ―not a suicide pact‖380 
and thus, nations are allowed to protect themselves. This is demonstrated by the fact that in 
the US, Article I is not absolute and allows for suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Similarly, Article 15 of the ECHR allows the UK to derogate from the Convention in certain 
circumstances.  
 
Thus, whilst this thesis argues that civil liberties must not be unnecessarily or 
disproportionally curtailed, it also recognises that the governments in the US and the UK 
would undoubtedly be hindered without the ability to protect its citizens. Thus, certain 
situations, like those experienced during the American Civil War, the World Wars and the IRA 
threat in the UK may require temporary infringements on certain civil liberties to try and 
prevent further attacks. However, such infringements should cease when hostilities towards 
the nation end or the perceived threat is no longer at a heightened level. The War on Terror, 
which began in 2001 has continued for nearly a decade now and is longer than both the First 
and Second World Wars.  
 
It is therefore argued that nations should, as far as possible, adopt a human rights approach 
which upholds long standing and fundamental values such as a broadly liberal conception of 
the Rule of Law. This could be done by using the ordinary rules of criminal justice to deal 
with suspected terrorists. Furthermore, it is argued that to follow such a long term approach 
would provide an adequate platform for other countries in the struggle against 
terrorism. However, it is recognised that protecting national security interests is at the heart of 
all nations, however both the Executive and the judiciary as upholders of the Rule of Law, 
should ensure the action taken is both adequate and necessary in the sense of proportionate 
(no more but also no less than what is called for). 
 
Furthermore, the thesis concludes that the UK is in a better position than the US because of 
the obligations placed upon it by the European Convention of Human Rights. The European 
model seems a more adequate model to deal with perceived threats of terrorism and those 
found guilty of involvement in terrorist action. Firstly, the European Convention provides for 
a hierarchy of rights, -rights which are absolute and can never be curtailed, e.g. the right to 
life and the right to be free from torture, and also lesser rights which would justify restrictions 
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when the Executive claim. Nevertheless, by incorporating Article 15, the ECHR allows for 
derogation and thus, allows the circumvention of rights in certain situations. This derogation 
provides the adequate balance in ensuring individual rights are not unnecessarily infringed 
whilst also ensuring that countries have the necessary means available to deal with 
emergency situations which would require nations to derogate from their obligations under 
the Convention.  
 
Also, although the UK has an unwritten Constitution and the US has a written Constitution, 
the UK courts have historically been more forthcoming in upholding Rule of Law whereas in 
the US, the Supreme Court has typically deferred to the Executive. However, in doing so the 
US has retained the constitutional principle of separation of powers by upholding its role as 
interpreters of the law and not makers of the law. 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the US adopt a model like that of the UK with a court similar to 
that of the European Court of Human Rights which is the overriding international supreme 
body due to the UK‘s international obligations. This allows the Court to objectively oversee 
the power of the Executive, irrespective of the Royal Prerogative. 
 
The thesis also concludes that the role of the judiciary includes ensuring that the Executive do 
not act beyond the realms of their powers. Thus it is argued that Executive action must 
always be constrained by the judiciary. For example, in relation to the use of control orders in 
the UK, it is argued that the Home Secretary should be able to justify his reason for issuing a 
control order to prove it is not just on mere suspicion. However the rights the order curtails 
after judicial approval of issuing the order, should remain the discretion of the Home 
Secretary. Therefore, as long as the restrictions do not interfere with absolute rights such as 
right to life, exceptional times mean that the judiciary should allow the Executive the 
appropriate discretion to decide the necessary actions.  
 
However, it is important to note that the judicial review process in the US is more developed 
that that of the UK. The US has more substantive judicial review as it can strike down 
measures and the judiciary can challenge decisions which it considers are unconstitutional. In 
contrast, judicial review in the UK is greatly limited as it is more procedural and fails to 
declare that decisions are incorrect and instead questions the way in which the decision was 
made. Nevertheless, the UK model is preferred as it is believed that the European Convention 
105 
 
of Human Rights is an adequate model to deal with the threat of terrorism as it strikes a 
viable constitutional balance between national security and individual rights. 
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